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PRESIDENT BUSH'S 1990 POLICY ON THE
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INDUSTRY: A
THORN IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
REFORM IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
JENNIFER A. MANNER*
PREFACE**
ALMOST TWO years ago, the Soviet Union, as the
£I3world knew it, ceased to exist. It split into independ-
ent sovereign states, with Russia taking the title of the
continuing state of the Soviet Union. Presently, the exact
role of Russia in the world is uncertain. However, two
things are evident. First, it is likely, if unfortunate, that
President Clinton will continue President Bush's policy,
originally aimed at the Soviet Union essentially banning
the use of Russian commercial space launch vehicles,
launched from Russian sites, to carry U.S. manufactured
commercial communications satellites. Second, Russia
has stated that it will, and to date has, continued to carry
out the international obligations of the Soviet Union. It is
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do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Communications Commission).
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University Law Center for his encouragement with this article.
** After acceptance for publication of this article, the United States and Russia
began negotiating an agreement concerning Russian entry into the U.S.
commercial space launch industry. As of press, an agreement was reached in
principal, but not officially concluded.
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with this viewpoint this article has been written to reflect
today's realities. In these times, however, today's realities
are not always those of tomorrow.'
I. INTRODUCTION
President Bush in his 1990 Policy Statement on the
Commercial Space Launch Industry2 (Commercial Space
Launch Policy) specifically excluded the Soviet Union,
and therefore, Russia,3 from participating in the market-
place for contracts for the launching of U.S. manufactured
commercial communications satellites. The only excep-
tions were for extraordinary circumstances or at a single
mutually agreed upon location outside of the Soviet
Union with technology transfer safeguards imposed and
enforceable agreements relating to free and fair trade and
ballistic missile non-proliferation.4
To date, President Clinton has yet to issue his own
Commercial Space Launch Policy, and he has given little
indication that he intends to abandon the 1990 Commer-
cial Space Launch Policy statement in the near future.
Early indications from President Clinton signal that he
will continue his predecessor's ban on Russian launches
of U.S. manufactured commercial communications satel-
lites.5 Instead of continuing President Bush's ban, Presi-
As is apparent from recent news reports, the survival of non-Communist Rus-
sia remains uncertain. The United States, nonetheless, may be able to assist in the
final defeat of Communism by allowing the Russians full entry into the United
States commercial space launch marketplace. Regardless, should Russia revert
back to Communism, the United States may want to consider more stringent trade
and technology transfer measures than proposed in this article.
2 Commercial Space Launch Policy Approved by President Bush, Daily Rep. Exec.
(BNA) No. 174, at M-4 (Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Launch Policy].
See AnthonyJ. Blinken, Cold War Static on Fiber Optics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992,
at 19 (discussing President Bush's ban on the export of sophisticated telecommu-
nications technology to the former Soviet Union); Quayle Advises White House to Ap-
prove Use of Russian Launches, SATELLITE WK.,June 19, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Quayle
Advises White House] (stating that the "Bush administration is looking at all United
States-Russian deals with great caution").
I Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4.
5 See Russia's Proton Rocket Chosen for INMARSAT III Launch, SATELLITE WK., Nov.
16, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Russia's Proton Rocket]; BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUT-
TING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA 152 (1992); see also IN-
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dent Clinton should vigorously pursue the laudable goals,
and the criteria to meet them, concerning the former So-
viet Union, laid out in the 1990 policy statement. This
will allow President Clinton to achieve something that
President Bush failed to during his incumbency: provide
Russia with the opportunity to market a reliable service in
the United States in exchange for concessions on trade,
technology transfer, and ballistic missile proliferation.
The 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy does not
expressly state the specific criteria for allowing the former
Soviets full entry into the U.S. commercial space launch
market to offer launch services at Russian sites. A thor-
ough reading of the policy statement as a whole, however,
should lead the Clinton administration to the conclusion
that there are three criteria that Russia should meet for
this ban to be lifted. These criteria are: 1) full entrance of
Russia into the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace
must be consistent with U.S. national security through
U.S. technology transfer objectives; 2) an agreement must
be reached with Russia that will ensure compliance with
free and fair market pricing in offering commercial space
launch services to the U.S. communications satellite in-
dustry; and 3) an enforceable agreement achieving the
non-proliferation of ballistic missiles with Russia must be
concluded. These criteria should be pursued swiftly by
the Clinton administration and should not be used, as
they were by the Bush Administration, as a tactic to delay
reaching a mutually beneficial relationship between the
United States and Russia.
Technological transfer and economic objectives sought
by the United States can be achieved by entering into ex-
ecutive agreements containing, where appropriate, verifi-
cation procedures and withdrawal provisions which will
MARSA T Awards Launch to Proton; Forges Ahead on Project 21, SATELLITE NEWS, Nov.
16, 1992, at 1-2 [hereinafter INMARSAT Awards Launch to Proton] (stating that
Vice-President Gore is likely to take a pro-U.S. launch industry stance in setting
U.S. space policy).
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ensure Russia's compliance.6 Furthermore, ballistic mis-
sile proliferation, a more serious national security and for-
eign policy concern, can be controlled through interim
measures until a multilateral treaty regime can be
established.7
If President Clinton actively pursues the objectives of
these criteria, Russia should be allowed to enter into the
U.S. commercial space launch market in the not so distant
future. Offering commercial launches conducted at for-
mer Soviet sites will assist in Russia's transition to a free
market economy and a democratic society, an important
goal of the Clinton administration.8
II. TIME FOR A CHANGE
Throughout the Cold War the United States was preoc-
cupied with the Soviet Union as a long term military,
political, and ideological enemy. This preoccupation was
apparent in all aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Although
the Communist regime has dissolved it would be an error,
as President Clinton has recognized,9 for the United
States to disengage its one-time unrelenting interest from
the former Soviet Union while it is in the process of con-
verting to democracy. U.S. foreign policy must adapt to
meet these changing circumstances.
The portions of the 1990 Commercial Space Launch
Policy issued concerning the former Soviet Union are now
part of the same bygone era as the Communist regime.
While a restrictive policy might have been necessary dur-
6 See infra part VI.A-B.
7 See infra part VI.C.
a CLIN ON & GORE, supra note 5, at 138 (assenting that the Clinton administra-
tion would aspire to "help the people of the former Soviet empire ... build free
political and economic institutions"); Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Likely to Seek
Even More Russian Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at A8 (proposed aid includes
monies fro Russian start-up companies).
9 CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 137 (citing as an example of a failed policy
of the Bush administration the length of time it took to recognize and assist "the
new nations of the former Soviet Union"); see Gwen Ifill, Clinton Meets Russian on
Assistance Proposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at A14; Steven Greenhouse, Christo-
pher Backs Yeltsin in Vote Plan; Seeks More U.S. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993 at Al.
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ing the Cold War, a new generation of Americans recog-
nize the need for easing technology transfer restrictions
and pursuing free and fair trade to foster a union with a
one-time enemy who is now a potential ally of the United
States. This new generation recognizes that lifting tech-
nology transfer restrictions and engaging in high-technol-
ogy trade with Russia is an important impetus for Russia
to leave its centrally planned economy behind and to pro-
gress toward a free market economy. This in turn will
help lead it down the road toward forming a politically
stable democratic society.
The United States has consistently held itself out to the
world as an on-going successful experiment in democracy
and free market principles. In line with this, the United
States has welcomed, encouraged, and protected those
who aspire to these same values. Today's events in Russia
offer the United States the greatest historical opportunity
to promote these values and to nurture a democratic na-
tion and free market trading partner which will contribute
to global economic, military, and political stability. Presi-
dent Clinton should pursue this opportunity while a newly
independent Russia has the chance to evolve into a demo-
cratic nation.
A change in the Commercial Space Launch Policy to al-
low Russia to enter the commercial space launch market-
place is necessary now. It is unnecessary to tie Russia's
hands by limiting space launch services to a single launch
site outside its territory based on technology transfer re-
strictions and economic grounds. 10 Russia will agree to
restrictive criteria in both areas in order to offer space
launch services to the U.S. commercial communications
satellite market, thereby receiving the benefit of an influx
of much needed hard currency.
Basing the opening of the U.S. payload market to Rus-
sia upon a ballistic missile non-proliferation agreement is
an important U.S. foreign and national security policy
10 See infra part VIA-B.
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goal which will assist in achieving world stability and
peace. Interim measures restricting Russia's transfer of
ballistic missiles to other nations for peaceful uses only,
however, are sufficient until an effective multilateral treaty
regime can be negotiated and concluded after the open-
ing of the U.S. communications satellite launch market to
Russia as a full launch service provider.
III. THE POLICY ITSELF
The 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy was
adopted by President Bush with the intention of fostering
the speed and development of the U.S. commercial space
launch industry. However, a residual effect of this policy
has been to serve as a thorn in the side of the former So-
viet Union in its transformation to a free-market economy
and a democratic nation.
The Commercial Space Launch Policy, officially an-
nounced on September 5, 1990, provides:
POLICY FINDINGS
A commercial space launch industry can provide many
benefits to the United States including indirect benefits to
national security.
The long term goal of the United States is a free and fair
market in which United States industry can compete. To
achieve this, a set of coordinated actions is needed for
dealing with international competition in launch goods
and services in a manner that is consistent with our non-
proliferation and technology transfer objectives. These
actions must address both the short term ... and those
which will have their principal effect over the long
term....
- In the near term, this includes trade agreements
and enforcement of those agreements to limit unfair com-
petition. It also includes the continued use of United
States manufactured launch vehicles for launching United
States government satellites.
- For the longer term, the United States should take
actions to encourage technical improvements to reduce
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY
the cost and increase the reliability of United States space
launch vehicles.
IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS
The United States government will enter into negotiations
to achieve agreement with the European Space Agency
(ESA), ESA member states, and others as appropriate,
which defines principles of free and fair trade.
Non-market launch providers of space launch goods and
services create a special case because of the absence of
market-oriented pricing and cost structures. To deal with
their entry into the market there needs to be a transition
period during which special conditions may be required.
- There should be no change in the United States
government's longstanding policy to deny, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, exports of satellites and satel-
lite components to the Soviet Union.
- The United States will seek to limit the use of So-
viet launch vehicles, launch equipment, technology or
training to a single mutually agreed upon location outside
the Soviet Union. In addition to technology transfer safe-
guards, United States support for such use of Soviet man-
ufactured launch vehicles will be contingent on
enforceable agreements related to free and fair trade and
to ballistic missile non-proliferation.
- The United States will also seek an agreement that
launch services offered commercially will be in compliance
with a common approach for the entry of non-market
economy countries as negotiated by the United States gov-
ernment with foreign launch providers, as appropriate.
There must also be an effective means of enforcing inter-
national agreements related to space launch goods and
services. "
1 Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4. On February 12, 1991, President Bush
issued guidelines that concerned in part the commercial space launch industry.
The only guideline that effects the U.S.'s treatment of Russian entry into the U.S.
commercial space launch marketplace provides that the "U.S. will work toward
establishment of an international trading environment that encourages market-
oriented competition by working with its trading partners." HousE COMM. ON
SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY, 102D CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY: THE U.S. COMPETITIVE POSITION 7 (Comm. Print 1991)
(prepared by David P. Radzanowski & Marcia S. Smith of the Cong. Research
Service).
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IV. THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AFFECT THE
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY
TOWARD THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Before examining the 1990 Commercial Space Launch
Policy, and how President Clinton can meet its policy
goals so that Russia may soon gain entrance into the U.S.
commercial space launch marketplace, it is important to
examine the involvement of several U.S. governmental
agencies in developing and implementing this policy.' 2
The bulk of the agencies that have input into the former
Soviet Union's entry into the United States marketplace
for the launching of United States manufactured payloads
in the recent past have taken a dim view of its competition
against American space launch providers. 13 In other
words, these agencies have been extremely pro-American
when it comes down to who will launch U.S. manufac-
tured commercial satellites into orbit. This policy posi-
tion is unlikely to change dramatically under the Clinton
administration.
The only exception to this pro-American outlook has
been that of the U.S. Department of State. 14 The Depart-
ment of State has taken the view in enacting its policy that
the United States must not establish trade policies aimed
at the former Soviet Union that would bar beneficial rela-
tionships for U.S. companies, unless the policies are ad-
verse to the United States national interest and security.
The Department of State, under Warren Christopher, is
12 The agencies that will specifically be discussed in this context are the U.S.
Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, the International Trade Commission, and the U.S. Department of
Commerce. The Department of State is the only U.S. governmental agency that
has consistently advanced free trade with the Soviet Union in the commercial
space launch field.
13 See Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3.
'4 See id. The State Department was in favor of lifting the ban on Russian com-
mercial space launches for an INMARSAT mission using a U.S. commercial satel-
lite. Id.; see also Edmund L. Dandrews, INTELSAT to Lease Russian Satellites, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at D3.
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likely to continue this policy stance.' 5
The U.S. Department of Transportation is the first
agency that will be discussed in the context of the pro-
American bias that exists in the carrying out of the Com-
mercial Space Launch Policy by governmental agencies.' 6
The Department of Transportation plays a large role in
regulating the commercial space launch industry in the
United States. In November of 1983, President Reagan
created the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(OCST) in response to the regulatory confusion that ac-
companied the first commercial space launch of a satellite
by a U.S. company.' 7
OCST has demonstrated its commitment to facilitating
U.S. industry's participation in space launches by promot-
ing and trying to increase the United States' share of the
commercial space launch market.' s In doing so, OCST
has relied upon its mandate, to "nurture a versatile na-
tional launch capability."' 9 This mandate also provides
OCST with the impetus to act as the liaison between the
U.S. commercial space launch industry and the Depart-
ment of Transportation.2
The importance of OCST's role in carrying out the
Commercial Space Launch Policy is demonstrated by two
recent events. First, on October 31, 1991, an industry ad-
visory group to the Department of Transportation was es-
tablished to "take a quick look at the impact the shakeout
in the Soviet Union's space effort is likely to have on the
15 See, e.g., Gwen Ifill, Christopher and Aspin Named for State Department and Penta-
gon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at 1, 13 (quoting Warren Christopher as saying
that "[i]n today's world, that means that foreign policy and domestic policy must
be addressed simultaneously.., or else neither will be successful for very long").
16 See Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the Department of
Transportation was one of a handful of governmental agencies that was skeptical
in clearing the way of a Russian launch of a U.S. satellite for an INMARSAT
mission).
17 NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAw 167 (1988). By 1986, OCST had
enacted a complex web of regulations that U.S. industry has to meet in order to
obtain governmental approval of space launch licenses. Id.
i Id. at 171.
19 Id. at 173.
20 Id. at 181.
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United States space launch industry."' 2' The Commercial
Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COM-
STAC)2 2 put together this task force after its international
competitiveness working group forewarned that the
changes occurring in the former Soviet Union would have
a "profound impact" on the U.S. commercial space
launch industry. 3 The task force's mandate is to study
the "situation in the Soviet space industry and to 'look at
the options and alternatives and where they lead'." 24
Not surprisingly, the task force set up by COMSTAC
has not looked at ways to open up the U.S. commercial
space launch marketplace to the former Soviet Union. 5
Instead, this industry-led task force is examining ways to
divert Russia from entering into commercial space launch
ventures with U.S. payload manufacturers. 26 For exam-
ple, Richard L. Grant, chairman of a task force working
group and Boeing Program Manager for the Space Sta-
tion Freedom, suggested that one way to mitigate the po-
tential impact that Russia would have on the U.S.
commercial launch industry is to provide Russia with eco-
nomic aid as it shifts to a free-market economy. Alterna-
tively, he suggested subcontracting to Russia "in terms of
technology and components and things that might be use-
ful to improve our abilities to launch cost-effectively or do
a better job technically with our launch vehicles, and do
that as a way of giving them a different target than the
U.S. launch market.12 7 Therefore, COMSTAC and its
task force are searching for ways to disengage Russia's in-
terest from entering the U.S. marketplace for commercial
space launch services.
Secondly, COMSTAC members engaged in extensive
21 Soviet Shakeout Seen Impacting U.S. Commercial Launch Industy, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 181 [hereinafter Soviet Shakeout].
22 COMSTAC is an industry advisory group to OCST.
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lobbying of the U.S. government to encourage them to
keep the needs of the commercial space launch industry
utmost in mind as the now-canceled National Launch Sys-
tem was being developed.2 8 As Steve Dorfman, Hughes
Aircraft corporate vice-president and president of its
space and communications group, explained, "DOT [the
Department of Transportation] should be taking a leader-
ship role here to assure that the United States govern-
ment investment in development of expendable launch
vehicles keeps the United States industry competitive in
the international environment .... I recognize that it is
national policy to do that . . ,, 29 Should the Clinton
administration choose to reactivate the National Launch
System program or create a similar program, it is likely
that the Department of Transportation will once again be
advised by the U.S. launch industry to be wary of Russia's
entry into the commercial space launch marketplace. 0
The U.S. Department of Defense also has an important
role to play in determining and carrying out the commer-
cial space launch policy. The Department of Defense is
one of a handful of agencies involved in determining tech-
nologies that are of militarly significance and that should
not be exported to nations which are deemed hostile to
the interests of the United States.3 1 The Department of
Defense is the primary agency concerned with the
proliferation of space technology by the former Soviet
Union and, therefore, has been hesitant about allowing
the export of such technology to Russia. 2
28 Id. The National Launch System program was canceled in late 1992.
2 Id.
- CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 152. President Clinton has made his sup-
port of developing a competitive U.S. launch industry publicly known. Id.
si See Gary Wilmarth, The New World of Export Control, CONN. LAw., Sept. 1992, at
9; see also Public Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,673 (1992) (noting that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense is also involved in a national security working group to deter-
mine which dual-use satellites should be taken off the U.S. Munitions List).
32 See, e.g., Charles Aldinger, U.S. Fears Flight of Soviet Arms Technology, Atwood
Says, The Reuter Library Rep., Nov. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Current File; MartinJ. Hillenbrand, Export Control Policy in the 1990s: the Diplomatic
Perspective, in EXPORT CoNTROLS IN TRANsmON 62 (Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elli-
19931 991
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This hesitancy has been consistently expressed by high-
level officials of the agency. 3" For example, former Dep-
uty Defense Secretary Donald Atwood recently discussed
at length Russia's (and its predecessor's) financial desper-
ation, which he feels may lead to the proliferation of dual-
use space launch technology.34 He told reporters that of-
ficials at the Soviet Space Center openly discussed with
U.S. visitors the exchange of rocket technology for
outside investment to assist in supporting their space pro-
gram.35 Mr. Atwood said that Soviet Space Officials ap-
peared desperate for hard currency to keep their space
programs viable . 6 "[The Soviets] talked very openly
about wanting us to encourage the use of the proton
rocket outside the Soviet Union. '37  Mr. Atwood ex-
plained, "That's a space launch booster. It also happens
to be the core of a marvellous intercontinental ballistic
missile."3 8
Mr. Atwood has repeatedly stressed his desire to stop
the flow of technology that gives nations with unstable
governmental structures, or a history of aggression or ter-
rorism, the ability to make weapons of mass destruction.3
In this respect, Mr. Atwood is particularly worried about
the former Soviet Union causing problems for the new
world order.40 Technology proliferation fears such as Mr.
Atwood's undoubtedly played a role in the formulation of
the 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy statement and,
of course, will have to be answered by Russia for this pol-
ott-Gowers, eds. 1992). For example, during the Reagan administration the De-
partment of Defense dominated U.S. policy-making in the area of export controls.
s- For example, the Department of Defense was skeptical about lifting the ban
on the export of a U.S. manufactured payload for launch on a Russian booster
rocket for an INMARSAT mission. Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3.






40 See id. (discussing concern over possible sale of Soviet arms technology to
unstable governments).
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icy to be changed by the Clinton administration.4
The International Trade Commission (ITC) has a role
in enforcing the international trade parameters of the
United States commercial space launch policy. 42 The ITC
was created to protect the United States' interests and
predominant position in international trade.43 Interna-
tional trade in space goods and services is an important
up and coming issue on the ITC's agenda through the Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative, which
plays an important role in determining unfair trade is-
sues.44 For example, in 1984, Transpace Carriers, a U.S.
commercial space launch company, complained to the
ITC under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act regarding
subsidies provided for the European Ariane Rocket to
Arianespace by the European Community (EC).4 The
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) brought the com-
pany's complaint to President Reagan, who rejected the
retaliatory relief requested by Transpace Carriers under
section 301.46 President Reagan found that the EC did
not subsidize its launchers any more than other nations
with companies that participate in the commercial space
launch industry.47 As this example demonstrates, the ITC
has an important and presumably growing role in investi-
gating and determining unfair trade issues in the commer-
cial space launch sector.48
The State Department, in contrast to the other agencies
discussed, has been pro-competitive in its policy stance
toward the former Soviet Union in the policy area of com-
4' See infra part VI.C.
42 GOLDMAN, supra note 17, at 174.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
46 GOLDMAN, supra note 17, at 174.
47 GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTERSPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 235 (1989).
48 Id.; see infra part VI.B.2., note 201. Under the 1988 amendments to section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR now determines whether the trading
practice in question is unfair. REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 47, at 235.
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mercial space launches of U.S. manufactured payloads.49
The State Department has as its mandate overseeing and
coordinating the affairs of the U.S. government and na-
tionals among the rest of the world.5 0 However, the State
Department must ensure that the business of U.S. nation-
als dealings with foreign countries and their citizens does
not violate either U.S. national policy or negatively impact
national security. 5' It accomplishes this task by balancing
U.S. private and public interests before taking action.52 In
general, free and fair trade, as opposed to restrictions, is
the road that the State Department has taken when Russia
(and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) has been
involved.53
Specifically, the State Department determines, under
the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, 54 technolo-
gies that are military in nature and that should accord-
ingly not be exported, except under narrow
circumstances, to foreign countries. 5 The Department
places these items on the United States Munitions List. 56
It also makes decisions on what technology and products
should be removed from the United States Munitions List
and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Commerce.5 7 In 1992, the Department of State eased ex-
49 See Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3.
- The United States State Department is also charged with the registration of
space objects under the 1975 Registration Convention. GOLDMAN, supra note 17,
at 176.
51 Id. at 177.
52 Id.
51 See Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3; see also David J. Jefferson,
Lockheed and Russia's Khrunichev Form Commercial Satellite Launch Venture, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 29, 1992, at A3 (citing example of a joint venture between Lockheed Corpo-
ration and a Russian aerospace company).
- 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-2780 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
51 Id.; see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(a) (West 1990); 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1992). In
deciding whether to grant an export license on these items the State Department
must take into account the opinion of the Director of the Arms Control and De-
fense Agency as "to whether the export ... will contribute to an arms race, sup-
port international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of
conflict, or prejudice the development of. . . arms control arrangements." 22
U.S.C.A. § 2778(a)(2) (West 1990).
56 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1992).
57 See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 121) (proposed
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port restrictions on most communications satellites by re-
moving them from the United States Munitions List and
transferring export control of these products to the De-
partment of Commerce under the jurisdiction of the Ex-
port Administration Act. 58 Hence, the State Department,
by removing most commercial communications satellites
from the Munitions List, has taken the first step toward
relaxing export controls of these items to the former So-
viet Union. However, even though communications satel-
lites are now subject to the less stringent export
restrictions of the Export Administration Act, the Depart-
ment of Commerce is mandated by the Commercial Space
Launch Policy to continue the ban placed upon their ex-
port to countries of the former Soviet Union.
The specific role of the Department of Commerce in
administering the U.S. commercial space launch policy is
complex. In 1992, under the Export Administration Act,
the Commerce Department officially took jurisdiction
over the granting of export licenses for the majority of
commercial communications satellites. These rules, as
discussed later,59 while relaxing the controls on the ex-
Apr. 22, 1992). The Department of Defense is also involved in making these de-
terminations. Id. The role of the Department of Commerce in administering con-
trols on the export of communications satellites to the former Soviet Union is
further discussed later in this part and in part VI.A.
58 See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,312-13 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 770, 799). The
State Department still issues licenses for certain commercial communications
satellites that come within its jurisdiction under the Arms Export Control Act and
are listed on the United States Munitions List. These include satellites with the
following characteristics: military in nature; capable of remote sensing; antijam-
ming capability; designed, modified or configured for intersatellite data relay links
that do not involve a ground link; spaceborne baseband processing equipment
that uses techniques other than frequency translation that can be changed on a
channel by channel basis; employing certain cryptographic items; employing cer-
tain radiation-hardened devices; having propulsion systems permitting accelera-
tion of the satellite on-orbit at rates that are greater than 0.1 g; and having orbit
transfer engines which remain permanently on the satellite and which are capable
of being restarted after achievement of mission orbit and providing acceleration
greater than 1g. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,315-17 (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 121). This
article does not argue that these satellites be released by the United States for
export to the former Soviet Union because they are a restricted export based
upon genuine national security concerns.
.9 See infra part VI.A.
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port of many U.S. manufactured communications satel-
lites to the free world, continue strict export restrictions
on these same products to the former Soviet Union. 60
For example, a validated export license must be ob-
tained from the Commerce Department for a U.S. com-
pany to export a communications satellite to the former
Soviet Union, in contrast to the general license that is re-
quired for export of this same technology to the Western
world. 61 The Department of Commerce must consider a
number of factors before granting the validated license,
including: "1) the nature of the technology; 2) the desti-
nation; 3) the United States security interests; and 4) the
technology's availability outside the United States." '62
Since the Commercial Space Launch Policy bans, for the
most part, exports of manufactured communications
satellites to Russia based upon U.S. national security con-
siderations, the Commerce Department cannot issue vali-
dated licenses for export to Russia on these products,
unless advised otherwise by the White House. Hence, un-
less President Clinton lifts the Commercial Space Launch
Policy ban, the possibility of the Commerce Department
issuing export licenses for communication satellites to the
former Soviet Union is remote.63
Recently, however, it appeared that the aforementioned
governmental agencies had loftier goals in mind about
free and fair trade with the former Soviet Union in com-
mercial space launch services. In February of 1985, a re-
port was published by the Senior Interagency Group
(SIG) on International Communication and Information
60 57 Fed. Reg. 48,312, 48,313-15 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 770, 799)
(interim regulations, Oct. 23, 1992).
61 See id. at 48,312, 48,314.
62 JAMES DOBKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 8-15 (1988). For a
more complete discussion, see Thomas W. Hoya, U.S. Governmental Controls over
Technical Exports with Particular Reference to the Soviet Union, in LAW AND POLITICS OF
WEST-EAST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 65, 65-72 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1991).
63 See, e.g., Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that the Depart-
ment of Commerce expressed its hesitancy in authorizing the Russian INMAR-
SAT launch); Hoya, supra note 62, at 84.
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Policy. 64 In this report, the SIG found that a foreign and
domestic policy goal of the United States should include
"[p]ursuing a nondiscriminatory satellite launch policy." 65
However, the SIG suggestion was never enacted as U.S.
policy.6 6 This slip in agenda has caused the former Soviet
Union to suffer economically because it is not able to offer
its commercial launch services to U.S. commercial com-
munications satellite manufacturers. President Clinton
now has the opportunity to shift the policy stance of the
governmental agencies that participated in the 1985
White Paper so that the agencies may return to their for-
mer position instead of continuing to follow the protec-
tionist policies formulated under the Bush administration.
These policies served only to promote the interest of the
United States commercial space launch industry.
V. EXCEPTIONS
Before examining in detail the three criteria that this
article finds as the primary reasons that President Bush
issued the Commercial Space Launch Policy and before
discussing measures for the Clinton administration to fol-
low to meet these criteria, it is necessary to examine a
joint space venture between the United States and the So-
viet Union, two exceptions expressly provided by Presi-
dent Bush in his 1990 policy statement and eventually
64 SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION & INFORMA-
TION POLICY, A WHITE PAPER ON NEW INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS (1985)
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. The SIG consisted of representatives from the De-
partments of State, Justice, Defense, and Commerce; the Offices of Management
and Budget, Science, Technology and Policy, Policy and Development, and the
U.S. Trade Representative; the National Security Council; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the U.S. Information Agency; the Agency for International Development;
the Board for International Broadcasting; and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). See id.
65 Id.
66 Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3. Even with Vice-President Dan
Quayle and the National Space Council urging a lifting of the ban contained in the
Commercial Space Launch Policy so that Russia could launch a U.S. satellite for
INMARSAT, the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Transportation re-
mained skeptical. Id.
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approved, and China's favored treatment in the commer-
cial space launch field.
A. A JoINT GOVERNMENTAL SPACE LAUNCHING
President Bush in his 1990 policy statement did not ex-
clude the Soviet Union from launching U.S. governmental
non-satellite payloads from its own territory. By not fore-
closing this opportunity, President Bush allowed the
United States to participate in a historical and scientifi-
cally important joint space launch mission with the Soviet
Union.
In August of 1991, the first U.S.-Soviet joint space ven-
ture occurred since the history-making 1975 Apollo-
Soyuz space linkup. During this venture, a Total Ozone
Mapping Spectrometer6 7 was launched by a Soviet
booster rocket from a formerly top secret Soviet military
rocket base. 8 This historical event is the only time that
the Soviet Union, or its successor, has been allowed to
launch any U.S. manufactured payload from its own soil.
While this joint space launch effort was not easy to set
up,69 it is an example of how the United States and the
former Soviet Union can work jointly and successfully in
the commercial space industry using United States
payload technology and advanced Soviet manufactured
booster rockets. It also evidences how the national secur-
ity interests of the United States will not necessarily be
jeopardized by a commercial space launch of a U.S. manu-
factured payload, and therefore, presumably a commer-
cial communications satellite, by Soviet manufactured
boosters from a Russian launch site.
The then Soviet Union, via Moscow radio, expressed
hope shortly after the launch that in 1993 a Soviet cosmo-
67 The Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer, a U.S. device designed to monitor
holes in the earth's ozone layer, has, certain properties that are similar to a
satellite.
- John-Thor Dahlburg, U.S. Probe Goes Aloft on Soviet Rocket, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
16, 1991, at A13.
69 Id. For example, it took two years to put this deal together.
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naut 70 may take part in a United States space shuttle flight
and that a U.S. astronaut may join a Soviet crew7' aboard
the Mir space station. 72 These joint missions, if accom-
plished, will be significant breakthroughs for Russian and
U.S. space and political relations. 73 As will be discussed
later,74 however, even greater space-related milestones
can be achieved if the U.S. ban on the use of one-time
Soviet equipment and sites to launch U.S. manufactured
payloads is lifted by the Clinton administration.75
B. THE ONE ALLOWED FOR LAUNCH SITE
On August 22, 1990, President Bush authorized the
State Department to approve a U.S. commercial payload
company's license to participate in Australia's proposed
Cape York commercial space port.76 Australia had chosen
Soviet manufactured booster rockets to launch U.S. man-
ufactured payloads.77 Australia and the Soviet Union had
to meet the four requirements laid out in the 1990 Com-
mercial Space Launch Policy in order for a U.S. manufac-
70 Now that the Commonwealth has risen, it is fair to say that a Commonwealth
cosmonaut would participate.
71 With the recent changes it appears likely that if such a project occurs, it will
be with a Commonwealth crew.
72 Dahlberg, supra note 68, at Al3.
73 See Kathy Sawyer, U.S., Russia Sign Pact on Joint Space Flights, WASH. POST, Oct.
6, 1992, at A4. U.S. and Russian officials signed a pact in late 1992 that provides
for a Russian cosmonaut to fly on a U.S. space shuttle in 1993 and a U.S. astro-
naut to fly on the Mir space station in 1995. Id. But see Doug Stewart, Interview
Roald Sagdeev, OMNI, Dec. 1991, at 56, 122. Sagdeev stated, "[C]ooperation in-
volving pooling of resources, not only costs but also talent and know how, has a
better chance today" of engendering support for ajoint U.S.-Soviet Mars mission
than "[c]ooperation in space used as in international propaganda ploy." Id.
74 See infra part VIII.A.
75 Craig Covault, Soviet Collapse Damaging Space Program Infrastructure, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16-23, 1991, at 18.
76 The corporation USBI, a division of United Technologies is manufacturing
the payloads. Telephone Interview with Gonn, Counselor, Australian Embassy
(Nov. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Counselor Gonn]; see also
President Bush Clears Way for USBI Role at Cape York Spaceport, Australia, SATELLITE
NEWS, Aug. 27, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter President Bush Clears Way]. At that time, the
State Department issued export licenses on commercial satellites. See 22 C.F.R.
part 121 (1991).
7 President Bush Clears Way, supra note 76, at 1.
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tured commercial communications satellite to be
launched by Soviet booster rockets. 78  These require-
ments included 1) an agreement that Cape York would
serve as the single location outside the Soviet Union
where the Soviets would participate in a launch of a
United States manufactured communications satellite;
2) the imposition of technology transfer safeguards; 3) an
enforceable agreement relating to free and fair trade; and
4) an agreement relating to ballistic missile non-
proliferation.79
The Cape York location in Australia was mutually
agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union.80
The Soviets also agreed that they would honor world
prices and attract business based on the reliability and ef-
fectiveness of their product.8 The interests involved also
agreed to certain U.S. national security measures to allow
Soviet boosters to lift U.S. manufactured payloads. These
measures included: 1) the Soviet Union and Australia
would observe the Missile Technology Control Regime;8 2
and 2) U.S. regulations on technology transfer8 3 to the
Soviet Union would be observed.84
This agreement set an important precedent that dem-
78 Id.
79 Telephone Interview with Counselor Gonn, supra note 76; see Bush Issues Com-
mercial Space Launch Policy, Approves Australian-USSR Launch Venture, 54 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at 381 (Sept. 10, 1990).
80 Australia also concurred. See Cape York Commercial Spaceport: Update, Austra-
lian Space Office, Feb. 1990.
81 President Bush Clears Way, supra note 76, at 1.
82 Id.
83 Current U.S. regulations prohibit the export of satellites containing Ameri-
can-made technology to most of the former Eastern Bloc based on considerations
of national security. Cape York officials have said there will be little chance of
technology transfer to the Soviets, as they will only be supplying the rockets, while
Australian teams, trained by the Soviets, will mate payloads with boosters. Id.; see
also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1988); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1988); 57 Fed. Reg.
48,312 (Interim regulations, Oct. 23, 1992).
84 The former Soviet Union, while not yet signing the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime, pledged through President Gorbachev in a joint statement with Pres-
ident Bush to observe the regime. President Bush Clears Way, supra note 76, at 1.
This pledge will most probably be continued by the former Soviet Union during
the Clinton presidency.
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onstrates the former Soviet Union's willingness to comply
with strict restrictions in order to participate in the mar-
ketplace for launching U.S. manufactured payloads. Pre-
sumably, Russia will live up to the obligation agreed to by
its predecessor, and hence, the Clinton administration
should continue U.S. support of the Russian-Australian
launch venture.
Since the Russians are only allowed to participate as a
supplier of launch services from one site outside of the
former Soviet Union, they are effectively cut out of com-
peting for more than a marginal amount of the market-
place for the launching of U.S. manufactured
communications satellites. In this respect, as discussed
later in this section,85 there has been a large disparity be-
tween the way that Russia and China have been treated by
the United States, most notably by the Bush
administration.
C. AN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE
The 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy specifically
allowed for a commercial space launch of a U.S. manufac-
tured payload by the former Soviet Union on its own terr-
tory only if there were "extraordinary circumstances. 86
An "extraordinary circumstance" occurred in June of
1992. After pressure from his vice-president and the Na-
tional Space Council, President Bush agreed to allow the
Russians to launch a U.S. commercial communications
satellite from Russian soil for an International Marine Sat-
ellite Treaty organization (INMARSAT) mission in
1994.87 President Bush forewarned that his approval was
for "this launch only" and that it did not mean that "all
85 See infra part V.
86 Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4.
87 Russia's Proton Rocket, supra note 5, at 1-2 (INMARSAT officially chose the
Russian Proton rocket for a future launch in November of 1992); Proton Launch of
INMARSA T Satellite Approved, SATELLITE WK., June 22, 1992, at 1; see Quayle Advises
White House, supra note 3, at 3.
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future missions will be okayed.""s  Furthermore, the
agreement for this one commercial space launch by the
Russians will be subject to safeguards that the United
States will prescribe prior to launch.8 9 Additionally, the
United States secured agreement that the Russians would
not "undercut American prices, terms and conditions." 90
There are two likely rationales for President Bush's le-
niency in this area. First, a U.S. satellite manufacturing
company would have had to forfeit a satellite launch for
INMARSAT, thereby possibly diminishing American com-
petitiveness in seeking, and success in obtaining, interna-
tional satellite business.9 1 Second, President Bush could
have been facing the reality that the U.S. launch industry,
even with a ban against Russian launches of U.S. commer-
cial communications satellites, is not able to compete as
successfully on an international basis as its satellite indus-
try.92 Therefore, President Bush may have recognized
that economic realities dictated that this launch should be
approved to keep the U.S. satellite industry commercially
viable, even at the cost of the U.S. commercial launch
industry.93
To date the Commerce Department has not granted an
export license to Martin Marietta Astro Space, the com-
pany supplying the satellite for this mission. 94 Therefore,
although officially approved, this deal could still meet op-




91 See infra part VIII.C.; Proton Launch of Inmarsat Satellite Approved, supra note 87,
at 1 (stating that the U.S. presently has approximately eighty percent of the com-
mercial satellite market).
92 See Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Approved, supra note 87, at 1 (stating
that the the United States only has fifty percent of the commercial space launch
market).
93 Id.
91 INMARSAT Awards Launch to Proton, supra note 5, at 1-2; see Comsat and Bush
Hit for Promoting Chinese and Russian Satellite Launches, SATELLITE WK., Oct. 19, 1992,
at 2-3 [hereinafter Comsat and Bush Hit] (stating that the United States government
will go through a long and politicized process before issuing export licenses to GE
for the Russian INMARSAT launch); Russian Proton to Launch INMARSAT-3 Satellite
in 1995, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 19, 1993, at 25.
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position from the Clinton administration in the export
stage. President Clinton should, however, allow this pre-
cedent-setting mission to go forward as agreed. He
should also recognize that economics require a total lift-
ing of the prohibition on Russian launches of U.S. com-
mercial communications satellites.
D. CHINA'S EXCEPTION
The 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy statement
does not expressly prohibit the People's Republic of
China from launching U.S. manufactured payloads, and as
a result there has been much leniency toward China in
this area. 95 In 1990, the United States and China entered
into an executive agreement which permits U.S. commu-
nications satellite manufacturers to export satellites to
China for launching.96 This agreement is the subject of
certain conditions, including:
1) China's willingness to limit the number of launches
planned; 2) China's agreeing to adjust its launch prices to
reflect more clearly its actual cost, so that United States
launchers would be able to compete favorably in the world
commercial space launch market; 3) China's agreement to
indemnify the United States for all amounts the United
States may be liable in connection with China's launching
of satellites under the Convention on International Liabil-
ity for Damage Caused by Space Objects; and 4) China's
agreeing to abide to certain technology transfer restric-
tions mandated by the Coordinating Committee on Multi-
lateral Export Controls.97
Another condition reportedly imposed upon China for
entry into the United States commercial space launch ser-
95 White House Authorizes Export Licenses for Launch of U.S. Satellites by China, 53 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 53 (Jan. 8, 1990) [hereinafter White House Authorize
Export licenses].
96 Id.
97 David J. Kuckleman, Regulation of Exports for Commercial Space Launches Outside
the United States, 38 FED. B. NEWS &J. 135, 138 (1991) (citations omitted). Unlike
the former Soviet Union, China was found to have provided sufficient safeguards
against the unauthorized transfer of U.S. technology. See also White House Authorizes
Expert Licenses, supra note 95, at 53.
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vice marketplace was cessation of supplying ballistic mis-
siles to Libya.9 8 This basically mandated that China abide
by the Missile Technology Control Regime, even though
it is not a formal member.99
Since this agreement was concluded, there have been
several instances of "misbehavior" by the Chinese that
have caused it to have its launch privileges revoked, in-
cluding human rights violations and alleged ballistic mis-
sile proliferation. 00 China, however, has consistently
been able to get the privileges reinstated by the Bush ad-
ministration.'l0 The leniency of the Bush administration's
policy toward China, as demonstrated by its continued
support of China's entry into the United States commer-
cial space launch market, continued despite China's poor
track record in living up to its international agreements in
this area. This reflects President Bush's uneven treatment
of Russia in entering the U.S. marketplace for commercial
space launches.10 2 President Clinton should level the
playing field and allow non-Communist Russia at least the
same ability to launch U.S. satellites as China. 0 3
VI. AN ANALYSIS
This section will examine alternative methods for Presi-
dent Clinton to meet the three criteria that were implied
by President Bush in his 1990 policy statement. President
Bush introduced these criteria as necessary for allowing
the entry of the former Soviet Union into the U.S. com-
0 Kuckleman, supra note 97, at 138.
"Id.
100 See, e.g., Comsat and Bush Hit, supra note 94, at 2-3; Yojana Sharma, China:
Satellite Industry Suffers Setback, International Press Service, June 5, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
10 See Comsat and Bush Hit, supra note 94, at 2-3; see also People's Republic of China
Receives Nod from Bush Administration, SATELLITE NEWS, Sept. 21, 1992, at 1-2 [here-
inafter PRC Receives Nod].
102 This leniency has occurred despite the fact that China is still a full-fledged
Communist nation, has a non-market economy and is an infamous ballistic missile
proliferator. See PRC Receives Nod, supra note 101, at 1-2.
os There is some indication that President Clinton will take a tougher policy
stance towards China, with respect to expecting that nation to live up to the letter
of its international agreements. See, e.g., CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 139.
SPACE LA UNCH POLICY
mercial space launch marketplace to provide launch serv-
ices from its own territory. If these criteria are met,
President Clinton should not hesitate to lift the ban on
Russia and allow it to fully enter the U.S. commercial
space launch marketplace.
A. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OBJECTIVE
President Bush's primary intention for banning U.S.
manufactured payload launches by the former Soviet
Union from its own territory was clearly to meet U.S. tech-
nology transfer objectives and hence, to protect national
security. Technology transfer objectives, and corre-
sponding national security objectives, however, can still
be protected if President Clinton allows Russia direct en-
try into the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace.' °4
In the United States, national interest dominates the
course that is set for policy in the area of space technology
transfer restrictions. U.S. technology transfer objectives,
in general, are reflected by the objectives of the Export
Administration Act of 1979105 and the Coordinating Com-
mittee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), as dis-
cussed later in this section. 0 6
The desired effect of practically every technology trans-
fer restriction is to diminish the potential of the target
country's military. 0 7 There is no difference with U.S.
space technology transfer restrictions placed upon the
former Soviet Union. In the area of commercial commu-
nications satellite exportation to the former Soviet Union,
however, the cost of these technological control efforts
exceed the likely benefits. Attempts to facilitate space
-04 President Clinton has stated that one goal of his presidency is to stop the
spread of weapons technology. See id. at 42.
105 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
'Or See supra part VI.A.2.
207 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PANEL ON THE FUTURE DESIGN
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS, FINDING
COMMON GROUND, U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
61-63 (1991) [hereinafter FINDING COMMON GROUND]. See also 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420.
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technology transfer for commercial purposes in Russia's
changing political and economic climate is too important
for the United States and the world to be disrupted by
extensive export controls. t08
Instead, the United States, under the presidency of Bill
Clinton, should pursue the policy goal of protecting tech-
nology from transfers to nations that pose a genuine dan-
ger to U.S. national security while freeing other
technology restrictions. For example, the United States
could allow free transfer of payloads that use non-military
communications technology whose transfer, even if an un-
friendly regime resurfaced in present day Russia, would
not greatly threaten national security. 0 9
As an added safeguard for U.S. technology, as dis-
cussed later,"t0 the United States and Russia can enter
into a bilateral executive agreement controlling the
amount of access and exposure the Russians may have to
U.S. manufactured payloads. In addition, a withdrawal
provision can be included in case the United States finds
its national security jeopardized by Russian launchings of
U.S. manufactured commercial communications satellites.
1. United States Technology Transfer Restrictions
By 1940, Congress gave the President authority to con-
trol the export of "militarily significant" goods and tech-
nology." ' By late 1948, the United States, in a precedent-
setting decision, began to control exports to the Soviet
Bloc. Shortly thereafter, Congress formally recognized
the need for continuing these technology transfer con-
trols during peacetime in the Export Control Act of
1949.112
The original policy objective of the Export Control Act
108 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 61-63.
1-9 See id. at 111.
110 See infra part VI.A.3.
'II This was codified in section 6 of Public Law 703 "An act to expedite the
Strengthening of the National Defense." FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note
107, at 62-63, 310-11.
-1 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2032 (repealed 1979).
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was to prevent improvements in Warsaw Pact military ca-
pabilities through its acquisition of the advanced technol-
ogy produced and utilized by the West. 1 3 An outgrowth
of this policy was the control by the United States govern-
ment of the export of goods and technology that had
commercial as well as military applications." 14  These
"dual-use" technologies are still controlled for export
purposes today by the United States government.'
The Export Control Act of 1949 was superseded by the
Export Administration Act of 1979, which is still in effect
today.'1 6 The Export Administration Act controls the ex-
port of commercial goods and technologies that the
United States deems would significantly contribute to the
military capabilities of an actual or potential adversary.' 17
One of the primary objectives of the Act is the national
security objective "[t]o restrict the export of goods and
technology which would make a significant contribution
to the military potential of any other country or combina-
tion of countries which would prove detrimental to the
national security of the United States."'"1 8
To implement the national security objective of the Ex-
port Administration Act, the Secretary of Commerce" 9 is
required to list the countries, technologies, and commodi-
ties that are to be controlled for export purposes based
upon the national security needs of the United States. 2 °
113 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 61-63.
114 Id. at 62.
115 Id.; see PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSFER CONTROLS ON
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 81
(1991) [hereinafter BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST]; see also 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2401-2420. It should be noted that in 1992 Congress failed to reauthorize the
Export Administration Act. Hence, the U.S. export control laws continue to exist
only under the President's emergency economic powers. Time Runs Out on Export
Administration Act Despite Last Minute Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 9, 1992, at 1-3.
116 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 62.
117 Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 8.
"1 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(a).
119 The Secretary is to act with the advice of the Secretaries of State and De-
fense, and other agency heads, as necessary.
120 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b); Exec. Order No. 12,214, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,783
(1980); see 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1988); see also FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra
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Once again, these controlled technologies and commodi-
ties include dual-use items.' 2' At times onerous restric-
tions are imposed on the export of goods and technology.
These restrictions act as an export ban. The rationale be-
hind these export controls is that if such equipment and
technology is denied to controlled countries, their mili-
tary potential will be severely impaired.122
Under the Export Administration Act, the former So-
viet Union is considered to be a controlled country, 23 and
communications satellites 24 are included as a controlled
dual-use technology. Therefore, commercial communica-
tions satellites cannot be exported from the United States
to the former Soviet Union except within extremely lim-
ited circumstances. 25
2. Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control
U.S. export controls are often analogous to multilateral
and bilateral agreements with foreign countries. 2 6 The
United States is a founding member of COCOM, an infor-
mal, non-treaty organization comprised of all NATO
countries, 27 Australia, and Japan. 2 8 treated in the early
days of the Cold War, COCOM has continually adminis-
tered a uniform system of multilateral export controls
over three categories of products: munitions, nuclear en-
ergy, and dual-use. 29 Products and technologies that are
subject to COCOM export controls are also subject to
U.S. export controls. 30 In addition, the United States has
note 107, at 63 (explaining that the President and the U.S. Department of Defense
also play a large role in determining controlled technology).
121 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 62.
122 Id.
123 See generally 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f).
124 15 C.F.R. § 779.1 (1992).
12- See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1991); see also supra part IV.A.
126 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 64.
127 All NATO countries except Iceland are members. Id.
128 Id. at 62, 106; see also Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 8.
129 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 65; Hiroshi Oda, COCOM:
Its Past, Present and Future, in LAW AND POLITICS OF WEST-EAST TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER 11 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1991).
1-o See generally 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i), 2405; see also Wilmarth, supra note 31,
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a number of bilateral agreements with non-COCOM
countries, which implement export controls on certain
technologies that are deemed to be in the interest of
United States as well as world security."3 ' In respect to
commercial satellite exports from COCOM countries to
the former Soviet Union, COCOM restrictions parallel,
for the most part, those that the United States has enacted
under the Export Administration Act.13 2
In the forum of COCOM, decisions on the amounts and
types of technology to release to nations outside of the
consortium are based upon the need for Western secur-
ity.' 3 With the recent political changes in the former So-
viet Union, however, security needs in general, and in
particular, technology transfer controls, should take on a
new form. 3 4 No longer is the former Soviet Union a
menacing force, but instead a group of sovereign states
looking to develop their political and economic stability
and, of equal importance, a growing potential market for
COCOM nations, including the United States.'3 5 Even
before fundamental changes occurred in the political and
socio-economic make-up of the former Soviet Union,
there was a tension that existed in this voluntary organiza-
tion that if technology transfer controls were too strin-
gent, nations seeking to trade with the former Eastern
at 8. Although at times, the U.S. has stricter export restrictions than are required
by COCOM. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (1992) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R.
§ 121).
Is' For example, Australia agreed to COCOM controls to move forward with
the proposed Cape York project. See supra part IV.B.
132 In general, there are stricter requirements placed on the export of commu-
nications satellites with certain military capabilities in the U.S. than required
under COCOM. See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,312 (1992) (discussing the limitations on
U.S. satellite exports).
13s FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 63-65; see generally Oda, supra
note 129, at 8-12.
- See, e.g., David Silverberg, Export Control Policies Uncertain as Changes Sweep Eu-
rope, DEF. NEWS, Mar. 6, 1990, at 12; see also Keith Bradsher, U.S. and Allies Ease
Sales to Former Soviet Republics, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at D18; FINDING COMMON
GROUND, supra note 107, at 106.
135 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 106.
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Block nations might break out from COCOM. 3 6 The
threat of breakout is more likely now that the perceived
security threat of the former Soviet Union has dimin-
ished. 13 7 This movement to do away with COCOM or at
least constrict its focus is even more acute with the forma-
tion of the European Community (EC) Single Market in
1992, as the EC looks for new markets to expand into, and
former Eastern block nations gain associated, and possi-
bly, permanent member status to the EC.
Not surprisingly, break out has occurred already within
the COCOM regime by Japan and Norway. 3 8 In the
1980's these nations jointly sold submarine propellers, a
controlled technology, to the former Soviet Union
through the Toshiba Corporation of Japan and Kong-
sberg Vaapenfabrikk of Norway.'3 9 As Japan looks for
markets to penetrate in these recessionary times, it might
be formally willing to break out or withdraw from this vol-
untary regime. 14° The likelihood of breakout by other
COCOM countries continues to increase, albeit at a faster
rate, as Russia continues to establish a free market
economy.
Since President Clinton has stated that he recognizes
that the Cold War threat is over, 14 1 he should officially
recognize that lifting certain technology transfer restric-
tions in the long run would be a politically wise move pri-
marily for two reasons. First, it would serve to mitigate
the chance of breakout from COCOM, which serves as an
important international organization to advance U.S. pol-
136 See, e.g., Silverberg, supra note 134, at 12; see also FINDING COMMON GROUND,
supra note 107 at 106.
'37 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 106.
138 See id.
'39 Id.; see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Hap-
hazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1175 (1987).
140 "Western European countries and Japan generally perceive more opportu-
nities and less risk in trading with the Soviet Union .... They generally resist
controls for foreign policy purposes." Amy Kaslow, U.S. Companies See Missed
Chances, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1989, at 9 (quoting Henry Nau, co-di-
rector of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda).
'-' See, e.g., CLINTON & GORE, supra note 45, at 129, 136; WilliamJ. Broad, Rus-
sians Invited to Help in Design of Space Station, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1993, at Al.
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icy. 42 And secondly, the United States should be the
world leader in opening up free trade in high-technology
goods and services with Russia.14 3 President Clinton's
predecessor recognized this reality when he agreed with
the other COCOM nations to alleviate many export re-
strictions on advanced telecommunications equipment,
such as fiber optics, to the former Soviet Union.144
A first step the new administration should take is to
push for COCOM to remove technology transfer restric-
tions on the export of commercial communications satel-
lites to the former Soviet Union for launching. This will
allow other members of COCOM to contract with Russia
for commercial space launch services without the need to
withdraw from the organization. Furthermore, by reduc-
ing the technology transfer restrictions on Western com-
mercial communications satellites to Russia, it is likely
that COCOM will have the impetus to reduce other tech-
nology transfer restrictions. 4  This will eventually give
Russia the ability to trade with the West on a more equal
footing.146
In a plea to the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations
in July of 1991, former Soviet President Gorbachev asked
that COCOM restrictions on technology transfers to the
Soviet Union be dropped as part of the reforms currently
taking place in Soviet Union. 47 In the same meeting, he
told of a forty billion dollar program to convert the de-
fense industry into a civilian-based one. 48 President Bo-
ris Yeltsin has continued the Gorbachev legacy as
demonstrated by his recent attempts to sell critical mili-
142 See Silverberg, supra note 134, at 12; see also FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra
note 107, at 317-8.
143 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 317-18.
144 Bradsher, supra note 134, at D18.
145 See id.
146 See Silverberg, supra note 134, at 12. "Western European diplomats.., are
arguing that technology that is allowed into other Eastern Bloc nations should be
allowed into the Soviet Union." Id.
"I Daniel Sneider & Amy Kaslow, Group of Seven Leaders Assess Merits of Soviet Case
for Assistance, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, July 17, 1991, at 1.
148 Id.
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tary technology to the United States and its allies, as op-
posed to nations the United States and its allies view as
hostile. Furthermore, President Yeltsin continues to take
measures to downsize Russia's defense industry in the at-
tempt to convert to a civilian free market economy. These
are key indicators that the Soviet Union was, and Russia
is, willing to convert a large portion of their military com-
plex into civilian industry so they can enter into greater
amounts of world trade.'4 9 Therefore, a concession on
the part of Western nations of dropping technology re-
strictions on the export of commercial communications
payloads will assist in the demilitarization of Russia by en-
gaging its one-time military industry in part by the com-
mercial launching of Western payloads.
3. A Bilateral Executive Agreement Can Ease Technology
Transfer Concerns
Three international conditions have influenced the de-
velopment of U.S. national security restrictions that exist
today. 50 First, since World War H the objective of deny-
ing the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw pact
countries access to military technology has been vigor-
ously pursued by Western nations.' 5' Second, this pol-
icy's viability depended upon the fact that almost all
advanced military and dual-use technology was developed
and produced in and by the United States and its political
allies.15 2 Finally, export controls were significantly effec-
tive in achieving their goals because the former Soviet
Union and its allies were committed to isolating their
economy from that of the nations that comprised the free
world. 153
These three conditions fostered cooperation among the
United States and its allies, in their imposition of export
149 Id.
,- FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 106.
151 See supra part VI.A.1.
152 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 106. See generally Carter, supra
note 136, at 1168-77.
$53 BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 115, at 106.
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controls, in order to retard the development of the Soviet
Union's military capability. This was an impetus to
United States and COCOM export controls. 5 4
At first, East-West trade was barely effected by such
technology transfer controls because of "the prevailing
market disjunctions-between military and commercial
products and between free market and centrally planned
economies," like that of the former Soviet Union.'55 The
United States found its competitive position barely af-
fected because its commanding economic and technologi-
cal position in the world ensured that export controls
would only have a nominal impact on its preeminent posi-
tion in international trade. 56 But, by the beginning of the
1980's, these advantages had slipped away and the ad-
verse consequences of export controls on international
trade reared their ugly head in the United States. 5 7 In
the 1990's "radical economic and political changes in the
[former] Soviet Union" began to occur, creating a new ba-
sis for political and economic relationships between the
East and the West.'58
Hence, the conditions which initially determined na-
tional security export restrictions on products and tech-
nology have changed in dramatic ways mandating that the
nature of the current Western security alliance must
change as well.' 59 Therefore, "[t]he current challenge is
to fashion a response that capitalizes on the enormous
political and economic opportunities presented by the
changes in... the (former) Soviet Union, while managing
154 Id.
155 Id. at 107.
156 Id.
151 Gordon B. Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade: An Analysis of Cyclical Trends,
in LAW AND POLITICS OF WEST-EAST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 51 (Hiroshi Oda ed.,
1991).
158 See BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 112, at 107; see Ferdinand
J.M. Feldbrugge, West-East Technology Transfer in the Context of Perestroika, in LAW AND
POLITICS OF WEST-EAST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 245-50 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1991).
159 Primarily because of the strengthening of the European Community in the
realm of foreign affairs. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 115, at
107.
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the rise associated with legitimate national security
concerns. "160
It is now in the United States' interest to permit the free
flow of dual-use technology, apart from a few truly critical
military items to Russia the Soviet Union's political suc-
cessor.16' In fact, by relaxing export controls on technol-
ogy, President Clinton could formulate a policy strategy
to encourage the process of economic and democratic re-
forms occurring in Russia, thereby in the long term
strengthening world economic, political, and military sta-
bility and security. 162 This is precisely the case of allowing
the export of non-military communications satellites to
Russia.
To calm fears of certain U.S. constituencies that Russia
will expropriate such technology for its own maniacal pur-
poses,' 63 President Clinton can make his policy of permit-
ting U.S. produced communications satellites to be
exported to Russia and to be launched on Russian rocket
boosters contingent upon entering an executive agree-
ment detailing the amount of contact the Russians may
have and the specific types of U.S. payloads allowed to be
exported for launch. An executive agreement setting out
such restrictions could also incorporate provisions al-
lowing Americans to supervise the launching of payloads
to ensure that the Russians do not have direct access to
certain technology that is in the U.S. national interest to
protect. This could be done by limiting both the number
of Russian personnel who can come in contact with an
American manufactured payload and the amount of time
that a U.S. payload may be on Russian territory prior to
160 Id.
161 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 169; see HousE COMM. ON
SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11, at 85.
162 Id.; see Munich Economic Summit Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership,
July 7, 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1213, 1219 (July 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Munich Economic Summit].
163 For example, the Center for Security Policy has expressed fear that allowing
Soviet launches of U.S. payloads might endanger U.S. technology. Conditions of
Commercial Space Launch Policy Will Get Close Look, AEROSPACE DAILY, July 13, 1990,
at 69.
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launching.16
To ensure that Russia does not circumvent technology
transfer restrictions, the agreement can contain on-site
verification procedures.165 Furthermore, a withdrawal
provision can be included for the United States if a Rus-
sian violation of the agreement is discovered or if the
United States' interests are jeopardized. 66
President Yeltsin should consent to such an agreement
since the Russians are diligently seeking hard currency to
turn the one-time state controlled economy into a free
market. It is doubtful that he would disagree with restric-
tions on technology transfer that would serve to unblock
any trade, much less in high-technology goods, with the
West. Precedent for Russia consenting to such an agree-
ment was already set when the former Soviet Union
agreed to limited access to U.S. manufactured payloads at
the Cape York launch site.' 67
B. A FREE AND FAIR MARKET WHICH UNITED STATES
CAN COMPETE
A basic goal of the 1990 Commercial Space Launch Pol-
icy is to ensure a free and fair market for the U.S. com-
mercial launch industry in which to compete. Therefore,
the Commercial Space Launch Policy states that any par-
ticipation in the U.S. commercial space launch market
would require "agreements to limit unfair competi-
tion."'' 68 President Clinton should allow the former So-
164 Officials of the former Soviet Union have stated that they will allow U.S.
satellite owners to remain with the satellite while it is on their territory. HOUSE
COMM. ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11, at 87.
165 Many arms control treaties contain on-site inspection provisions. See, e.g.,
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) (1992); Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty (CFE) (1991). Both are available through the Arms Control and
Defense Agency, as neither have been codified as of yet.
-6 This type of withdrawal provision is in most modern arms agreements to
which the former Soviet Union is a party. See, e.g., Multilateral Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 493, 729 U.N.T.S.
161, 175 (hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]; Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3446.
167 See supra part V.B.
6 Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4.
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viet Union to accede to this stated U.S. practice. As
discussed in this section, allowing the Russians full entry
into this market, even under this condition, will serve as
an important step toward fulfilling a Clinton goal: im-
proving future trade relations between Russia and the
United States. 6 9
Former President Gorbachev's acceptance in 1986 that
democracy was essential for the Soviet Union to thrive
was a crucial catalyst for change in that nation. However,
this meant that domestic political and economic
destabilization would follow in the then Soviet Union,
hence making a peaceful international environment which
would spur on the international trade absolutely essential
to the success of his plan. 70 President Yeltsin, as demon-
strated by his recent reform efforts, has followed his pred-
ecessor's lead in this area, while retaining the same needs.
This "economic perestroika" has led the Russians to de-
pend upon receiving help from the West through both aid
and the lifting of trade sanctions and export restrictions
on goods and technology.' 7'
The three arguments advanced to increase interna-
tional trade with Russia are as follows:
First, aid and trade can act as a catalyst to bring about or
facilitate further desirable economic and social changes.
Second, economic assistance and trade agreements can
function in a more political context as a direct quid pro
quo for specific concessions.' 7' Third.... failing to grant
aid or permit trade risks further serious deterioration of
169 See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 139; see also Craig Covault, Ariane
Launch Operations Slowed by Satellite Problems, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 8,
1993, at 24, 25 ("[S]ome managers believe the new Clinton Administration could
advocate siffer guidelines [than the Bush Administration] on Russian [launch ser-
vice] marketing").
170 See Reshaping the Soviet Economy: 500 Days to Shake the World, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 15, 1990, at 13 [hereinafter 500 Days to Shake the World] (explaining that the
proposed plan to reform the Soviet economy was based in part on fair market
principles and private ownership of property).
171 Id.
172 These concessions can include, as discussed in this Article, the entry of the
former Soviet Union into a treaty regime for the non-proliferation of ballistic
missiles.
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the internal political, economic and social fabric of [the
former Soviet Union], the consequences of which would
be unpredictable and undesirable.17 -
The likely result of the United States engaging in trade
with Russia will be a greater stake for the United States in
the success of the economic and political reforms under-
way in Russia. This increase in trade will eventually lead
to the East's greater integration with the West. Russia it-
self recognizes this reality, as demonstrated by its desire
to participate in international trade in space technology.
Roald Sagdeev, the former Director of the Soviet Space
Program, stated in a recent interview that "[o]ur space in-
dustry must be accountable not only to its Soviet but also
to its foreign scientific customers."'' 74 This demonstrates
that the former Soviet Union recognizes that accountabil-
ity is crucial to providing space-based services to the
United States and other international customers. There-
fore, President Clinton, as discussed later in this sec-
tion, 175 should act early in his incumbency and enter into
a bilateral executive agreement concerning fair pricing
with Russia. 76 Such an agreement should focus upon
Russia offering its commercial space launch services on a
free market basis, thereby allowing Russia to compete
fully and fairly in the United States commercial space
launch service marketplace. The opening up of former
Soviet launch services to the U.S. communications satel-
lite market is extremely important for Russia's transfor-
mation to a free market economy. Since the former
Soviets are technologically advanced in this area, by offer-
ing space launch services, they will be able to bring in a
173 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 50.
174 Stewart, supra note 73, at 56, 62.
17. See infra part VI.B.2.
176 For example, President Bush in the INMARSAT launch agreement with
Russia sought and received an agreement on fair pricing. Proton Launch of IN-
MARSAT Satellite Approved, supra note 87, at 1; see Jeffrey M. Leonorovitz, Russian
Proton Booster Offered in Indonesian Launch Competition, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 61-62.
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large influx of much needed hard currency177 while selling
a solid, reliable product and decreasing their reliance on
the defense industry. 7 8  A residual effect will be to
demonstrate first hand to Russia the attributes of free
market trade, spurring other free trade ventures onward.
This should lead eventually to a new trading partner for
the United States.
1. A Survey of the Commercial Space Launch Industry
There is a consensus that the commercial space launch
industry is profitable. Despite growing competition in the
United States from Arianespace 179 and China,"'0 there is
still room for other nations to compete for business.' 8 '
Furthermore, the advent of low earth orbit satellites
opens up even more commercial space launch service op-
portunities for all nations.' 82
In 1990, the eight commercial space launches occurring
in the United States generated revenues of $520 million
for the U.S. companies that participated.' 83 By the end of
1991, the Department of Transportation had issued
licenses for thirty-four commercial space launches to be
performed by the U.S. commercial space launch industry
by 1995.184 By the end of the century, activities in the
area of commercial space products and services could
177 "The Soviet space program is no longer looking for glory. It's looking for
survival." Stewart, supra note 73, at 63 (quoting Roald Sagdeev).
178 See Comsat and Bush Hit, supra note 94, at 2-3 (stating that the Russians "are
masters of successful flights"); Lost in Space, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 2, 1991.
179 Arianespace is the European Community's eleven-nation commercial space
launch consortium, which effectively competes with the United States commercial
space launch industry. CONGRESS OF THE U.S., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
How THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN EUROPE WILL AFFECT THE UNITED
STATES 95 (1990).
SO See supra part V.D.
181 The U.S. launch industry has approximately fifty percent of the world mar-
ket. Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Approved, supra note 87, at 1.
182 See Filep, Launch Vehicles and Spacecraft Futures, SATELLITE COMM., Oct. 1991,
at 14.
183 Space Trucking: Demand Takes Off for Commercial Launch Vehicles, HUNTSVILLE
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at 4.
-s Filep, supra note 182, at 15.
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provide the U.S. economy with almost three hundred bil-
lion dollars in revenue, as well as ten million jobs
annually.' 85
Despite this success, there is a fear on the part of the
commercial space launch industry. 18 6 The basis for this
fear, which Vice-President Gore shares, 18 7 is that the for-
mer Soviet Union will enter the U.S. commercial space
launch marketplace but not compete on free market
terms.188 President Clinton can avert these fears, as dis-
cussed below, 8 9 if the United States allows Russia to com-
pete in the commercial space launch industry under a
bilateral executive agreement that mandates competitive
pricing.
Even without the aforementioned executive agreement,
it is possible that Russia would offer their commercial
8- Art Dula, Private Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L L. 159, 163 (1986).
186 Richard L. Grant, chairman of a working group on the former Soviet Union
formed by the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, an indus-
try advisory group to the U.S. Department of transportation, discussed the possi-
bility of U.S. launch firms joining forces as a consortium to combat overseas
competition. Soviet Shakeout, supra note 22, at 181; see also supra part IV (discussing
the influence of U.S. governmental agencies on the U.S. commercial space launch
policy). But see Lockheed in Space Venture with Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at
D5 (noting that Lockheed and the Russian manufacturer of the Proton rocket
formed a commercial space venture to market Russian launchers for satellite
launches).
187 Vice-President Gore stated, "the emergence of [space industry] competitors'
from non-market economies increases the opportunities for predatory pricing -
the very same economic weapon that foreign countries employed in the 1980s to
target and destroy the American manufacturing base." Daniel Green, Flying Start
for Russia's Satellite-Launch Industry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at 4; see also INMAR-
SAT Awards Launch to Proton, supra note 5, at 1-2. Gore "has said that he wants to
protect the U.S. [launch] industry from artificially low-priced foreign competi-
tion." Id.
188 While many aerospace industry officials believe that the former Soviet Union
offers numerous business opportunities in the long-term, most remain reluctant
to enter into business ventures until the Commonwealth builds on the eight pil-
lars of a normal market economy: private property; ownership and enforceable
contracts; stabilization of the macro-economy; liberalization of prices; privatiza-
tion of enterprise; opening the economy to international market forces; liberaliza-
tion of trade; and limitation of governmental intervention in the economy.
Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Soviet Coup Collapse to Speed Defense Industry Shift to Civilian
Use, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 2, 1991, at 68, 69.
189 See supra part VI.B.2.
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space launch services at competitive market prices.' 90 For
example, when the Soviet Union entered the remote sens-
ing business by launching their own satellite, it charged
twenty-six cents more per square mile for an image than
Spot, the French remote sensing company. 19'
Contrary to the views of the commercial space launch
industry, the majority of U.S. domestic industry, and in
particular the U.S. payload industry, are fearful of contin-
uing outdated restrictions on doing business and trading
with the former Soviet Union.19 2 Currently, members of
the U.S. aerospace industry who would like to work on
business ventures with Russia in the commercial space
launch industry find its doors barred to them because of
the 1990 Commercial Space Launch Policy. 9 3 These
companies fear that such domestic constraints and inter-
national competition will cause the United States to miss
out on space related business opportunities in Russia.' 94
The primary concern of these businesses is the continu-
ance of the Bush administration's reluctance "to commit
itself forcefully to the sweeping reforms" in the former
Soviet Union, with the toughest restrictions placed on
high technology trade.9 5 Therefore, to alleviate such do-
mestic concerns, and to open new opportunities for U.S.
business, President Clinton must act now to open up
trade with Russia. 196
Although President Bush was correct that the U.S. com-
mercial space launch industry needs a free and fair market
in which to compete, his Commercial Space Launch Policy
19o But see Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that McDonnell
Douglas claims that Russian launches are "cheaper and have always been sup-
ported by the government").
191 Soviets Launch Almaz I Remote Sensing Satellite, SATELLITE NEWS, Apr. 15, 1991,
at 10. But see Green, supra note 187, at 4.
192 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 167.
193 See Kaslow, supra note 140, at 9.
194 See, e.g., supra part IV (discussing U.S. governmental agency positions on the
U.S. commercial space launch policy).
, Kaslow, supra note 140, at 9.
' CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 139. Clinton has stated that U.S. industry
should be encouraged to trade with the former Soviet Union "to ensure that the
United States is not shut out of the regions lucrative markets." Id.
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statement amounts to an economic protectionist measure
by barring the export of commercial communications
satellites outright to the former Soviet Union for launch-
ing. 197 The inevitable result of the continuance of this
protectionist policy by the Clinton administration will be
to hinder reforms in Russia, and in the long run, hurt the
U.S. domestic satellite industry and U.S. foreign policy.
2. A Suggestion
By ensuring market prices through a bilateral executive
agreement and encouraging Russia's commercialization
of space launches, stability in the economic and political
sphere of the former Soviet Union would emerge. If a
Russian commercial space launch business can compete
fairly and successfully in the world arena, it would give
Russia an impetus to enter into other free market ven-
tures, this would in turn benefit the former Soviet Union,
the United States, and the world.
To ensure that Russia competes in the commercial
space launch industry by using free market pricing, Presi-
dent Clinton and President Yeltsin should enter into an
executive agreement that mandates Russia's use of set cri-
teria to determine prices for space launch services offered
to U.S. commercial payload manufacturers.1 8 Two exam-
ples of pricing schemes that could be used as criteria for
an American-Russian fair market pricing agreement are:
1) basing space launch service prices on an average of
prices of similar launches performed by nations with free-
market economies over the past year; or 2) constructing a
pricing scheme for commercial space launch services
19, United States industry has "no problem" with non-market economies enter-
ing the commercial space launch industry assuming that they enter the arena
"under a suitable set of timing and (other) conditions that make that playing field
reasonably level." Lovelace Warns on Non-Market Economies and Space Launch Business,
AEROSPACE DAILY, June 28, 1991, at 533 (quoting Alan Lovelace, head of General
Dynamics' Commercial Launch Services Unit).
-98 For example, former Soviet President Gorbachev had indicated his intention
to integrate the Soviet economy with the international economy, based at least in
part on market principles. See, e.g., 500 Days to Shake the World, supra note 170, at
13; Russia's Proton Rocket, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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based upon the actual cost of the service, the existing
competition to provide the service and the demand for
the service. 99 In either of these fair pricing scenarios, or
by using any pricing scheme that might be imposed, Presi-
dent Clinton would want to include an escalation in the
base price of the commercial space launch service to com-
pensate for the time lag involved in the international
transaction and the foreign exchange risk that exists. °0
This would raise the base price of the space launch service
to reflect the economic realities of doing business with
Russia.2 ° ' President Clinton should also include a with-
drawal provision in the agreement in case Russia under-
cuts the agreed-upon free market pricing arrangement for
space launch services. This would provide additional pro-
tection against unfair competition by the former Soviet
Union to the U.S. domestic commercial space launch
industry.
The 1974 Trade Act20 2 provides the United States a fi-
nal protection against unfair pricing by the former Soviet
Union of commercial space launch services once a trade
agreement20 3 is entered into by the two space powers.
The Act empowers the ITC through the USTR to evaluate
foreign trade policy under a standard set by the United
States for unfair pricing.20 4 But, even more importantly,
this statute provides for mandatory retaliation when an
199 STEPHAN H. ROBOCK & KENNETH SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 452-53 (4th ed. 1989).
2 0 See id. at 454.
201 See id.
202 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
205 The United States anti-dumping statutes are not applicable to commercial
space launches performed by Russia. See 15 U.S.C. § 72 (Supp. 1991). Under the
U.S. anti-dumping statute a "good" must be exported into the United States. Id.
The same conclusion is reached under the U.S. countervailing duties laws for the
subsidization of exports of foreign "products." 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (Supp.
1991). Therefore, the only redress available to the United States in the unfair
pricing of launch services by the Soviet Union would be under section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act, as amended. This is because services are not covered by the U.S.
anti-dumping and countervailing duties laws. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
204 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988) provides in part:
§ 2411. ACTIONS By UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE.
(a) Mandatory Action....
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act, policy, or practice of a foreign country violates a trade
agreement with the United States. °5 If retaliation against
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines
under section 304(a)(1) that -
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions
of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade
agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United
States commerce; the Trade Representative shall take action author-
ized in subsection (c) of this section, subject to the specific direction,
if any, of the President regarding any such action, and shall take all
other appropriate and feasible action with the power of the Presi-
dent that the President may direct the Trade Representative to take
under this subsection, to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimi-
nation of such act, policy, or practice....
(c) Scope of authority ....
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law governing
any service sector access authorization, and in addition to the au-
thority conferred in paragraph (1), the Trade Representative may,
for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of subsection (a) or
(b) of this section-
(i) restrict, in the manner and to the extent the Trade
Representative determines appropriate, the terms and conditions of
any such authorization, or
(ii) deny the deny the issuance of any such authoriza-
tion ....
(C) Before the Trade Representative takes any ac-
tion under this section, involving the imposition of fees or other re-
strictions on the services of the foreign country, the Trade
Representative shall, if the services involved are subject to regula-
tion by any agency of the Federal Government.. .consult, as appro-




(1) On the basis of the investigation initiated under section
2412 ... the Trade Representative shall-
(A) determine whether-
(i) the rights to which the United States is entitled
under any trade agreement are being denied, or
(ii) any act, policy, or practice described in (a)(l)(B)
or (b)(l) of section 2411 ... exists, and
(B) if the determination made under subparagraph (A) is
affirmative, determine what action, if any, the Trade Representative
should take under subsection (a) or (b) of section 2411 ....
Id. § 2414(a)(1).
205 The United States Trade Representative must take action if he or she finds
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a foreign government is pursued by the USTR, its value
must be equivalent to the burden or restraint imposed on
U.S. commerce.2 6
To impose such a retaliatory measure, the USTR must
first determine the amount of monetary loss to U.S. indus-
try caused by the unfair trade practice of a foreign govern-
ment.20 7 Next, the USTR must decide how to determine
an equivalent burden, better known as retaliation, to be
placed on that foreign service.2 0 8 This practice allows the
United States to recover any monetary benefit that the
former Soviet Union gains by circumventing a trade
agreement with the United States for commercial space
launch services. Therefore, section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 can act as an additional and important check upon
any trade agreement on commercial space launches en-
tered into by the Russian and the U.S. governments.
C. LINKAGE TO BALLISTIC MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION
An important goal of the 1990 Commercial Space
Launch Policy statement is to help stop the proliferation
of ballistic missiles.20 9 President Clinton states that a high
priority of his administration is to cease the world-wide
proliferation of ballistic missiles. 210 Therefore, if Russia is
to enter the U.S. commercial space launch industry as a
full participant, President Clinton would most likely ex-
pect Russia to enter into a non-proliferation treaty.
Few would question that superpower cooperation is un-
abated in deterring the proliferation of ballistic mis-
siles.2 t1  Russia, surrounded by numerous potential
proliferators, has very strong incentives to join efforts to
that "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country ... violates ... or ... other-
wise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement." 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a)(l)(B)(i) (1988).
2- 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4.
210 See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 5, at 43.
211 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 55.
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stop the spread of missile technology.2 1 2 However, multi-
lateral, not just superpower cooperation, is necessary to
keep missile technology out of the hands of nations that
are likely to misuse it.213
A multilateral treaty regime based upon the non-
proliferation of ballistic missiles will probably take some
time to negotiate.21 4 Therefore, this Article proposes two
alternative interim measures that could take effect imme-
diately and allow Russia to enter the U.S. commercial
space launch marketplace as a full service space launch
provider while treaty negotiations are pending. These
measures include Russia formally joining the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or Russia and the
United States entering into a bilateral executive agree-
ment banning ballistic missile proliferation. 1 5
1. The Missile Technology Control Regime
The MTCR, formed in 1987, is a non-treaty consortia
of missile supplying countries led, at least informally, by
the United States. 1 6 The MTCR's purpose has always
been to restrict the export of goods and technology that
could be used to produce a missile with the capability of
carrying a nuclear warhead by a nation hostile to the re-
gime. 1 7 Injune of 1992, the MTCR revised its mission to
include restrictions on exports of goods and technology
that can be used to produce missiles carrying "all kinds of
weapons of mass destruction." 1  The MTCR has
adopted controls on the export of ballistic missiles and
212 See Vladimir Petrovsky, New Technology and Security Prospects After the Cold War,
13 DISARMAMENT 45, 49-50 (1990).
213 See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 134-35; see also Russia's Pro-
ton Rocket, supra note 5, at 2.
214 For example, the START treaty took over nine years to negotiate.
215 See also infra part VIII.B. (explaining that covered ballistic missiles must be
destroyed under some modem strategic and tactical arms control treaties).
216 LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS 1989-1990 15 (1990); see also FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at
70.
217 SPECTOR, supra note 216, at 15.
218 Munich Economic Summit, supra note 162, at 1221.
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ballistic missile technology for the ten nations2 1 9 who are
formal members and the four additional nations220 that
have agreed to implement comparable controls. 2 In
1991, the former Soviet Union agreed to complete com-
pliance with the MTCR, and Russia has, for the most part,
lived up to its predecessor's promise. Since 1991, there
has been only one reported violation of the former Soviet
Union's pledge, and this itself is an unresolved contro-
versy. The former Soviet Union, by agreeing to MTCR
restrictions, albeit informally, has made a first step in lim-
iting ballistic missile proliferation. If Russia agrees to for-
mally join the MTCR until a multilateral treaty banning
the proliferation of ballistic missiles can be concluded,
along with the other measures discussed earlier in this ar-
ticle, President Clinton should remove his predecessor's
ban on Russia's entry into the commercial space launch
industry.
2. A Bilateral Executive Agreement
Another option, until a new treaty regime can be for-
mally established, is that President Clinton can enter into
an executive agreement with Russia barring ballistic mis-
sile proliferation except for unambiguously peaceful pur-
poses. Such an executive agreement should include
provisions:
1) to control trade in components and end products that
could be used for ballistic missile weapon technology;
219 The nations are the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, Japan, It-
aly, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain. SPECTOR, supra
note 216, at 15.
220 These countries are Russia, Australia, Switzerland and Spain. Id.
221 Id.
222 U.S. Accused of Protectionism on Sanctions Against Russia and India, SATELLITE
WK., May 18, 1992, at 4. The Bush Administration alleged that the Russians vio-
lated their agreement to uphold MTCR restrictions in conjunction with their deal
with India to supply the latter missiles. The former Soviet Union was also invited
to informal consultations with COCOM over instituting common procedures for
insuring against diversion of 'sensitive items to military or other unauthorized
users.' " Bradsher, supra note 134, at D18; see also Steven Greenhouse, A Move to
Restrict Export of Strategic Technologies, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1992, at D8.
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2) on the targets of ballistic missile export control policies.
These could be on regions, areas of special concern 223 or
specified proscribed end users; 3) on the items to be con-
trolled; 4) on the actual controllability of the targeted
items; 5) on appropriate licensing procedures and en-
forcement measures; and 6) by Russia and the United
States on accountability to each other and on sanctions for
violations.224
3. A Final Solution: A New Treaty Regime
President Clinton could also impose a condition to the
aforementioned interim measures and the continuation of
Russia's full participation in the U.S. commercial space
launch marketplace that a binding multilateral treaty on
the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles must be con-
cluded within a set number of years, with Russia as a sup-
plier party to the treaty. 22- This regime, like the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty,22 6 would help ensure that ex-
ported technology is used only for peaceful purposes. It
should be enacted with the purpose of stopping the diver-
sion of ballistic missiles from peaceful purposes by install-
ing an enforceable international system of safeguards.227
Additionally, this treaty regime should have as its purpose
the curtailing of the ever-growing number of nations
building ballistic missile stockpiles that threaten U.S. and
world security.228 This could be accomplished by estab-
lishing limits, albeit in different amounts, for supplier and
non-supplier nations on the amount of ballistic missiles
they may produce and/or hold in reserve.
223 These areas could address peaceful users, for example.
224 FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 113.
225 See generally Michael O'Hanlon et al., Controlling Arms Transfers to the Middle
East: The Case for Supplier Limits, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1992, at 18.
226 Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Ballistic Missile Non-
Proliferation Treaty should curtail ballistic missile transfers for non-peaceful uses.
See generally Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 166.
227 This can be done through a regime compliance agency similar to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency created in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
See id.
228 Id. An aim of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is to stop the stock-pil-
ing of nuclear materials.
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To be effective, its membership should include the na-
tions that are advanced in the aerospace field and the po-
tential suppliers of ballistic missiles such as the United
States, the independent sovereign states of the former So-
viet Union including Russia, China, France, Britain, Can-
ada, Israel, and Italy, as supplier parties, and the rest of
the world's nations as non-supplier parties.2 29 The sup-
plier nations would need to agree to cooperate to ensure
that missile and space launch technology is transferred
only to other nations that have unambiguously peaceful
space launch programs. Therefore, this regime, like the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, would act to
ease access to this technology when used for peaceful pur-
poses, but discourage its diversion for military uses.
A large problem lies in preventing the retransfer from
nations who only intend to use such technology for peace-
ful purposes to those who plan to use it for other pur-
poses.23 0 Therefore, on-site inspection of technological
goods transferred from a supplier country to a non-sup-
plier nation would be a necessary part of this treaty re-
gime, as it has been in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty regime.23 ' President Clinton, by agreeing to the
aforementioned interim measures with the former Soviet
Union and allowing Russia full entry into the U.S. com-
mercial space launch marketplace, can negotiate a new
treaty regime which will establish the cessation of the
world-wide proliferation of ballistic missiles. This will not
only serve immediate U.S. and Russian interests, but will
benefit world stability over the long term.
VII. A PROBLEM NEGLECTED: DOMESTIC
CONCERNS
President Bush, by not allowing Russia entry into the
U.S. commercial launch marketplace from a former Soviet
229 Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this treaty should not exclude,
by date, countries which are presently not supplier countries. See id.
230 See generally FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 107, at 134-35.
231 Id.
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY
site, failed to address the current status of the United
States economy. The United States itself has faced a
budget crisis and a severe recession for several years.
President Clinton should recognize that the domestic eco-
nomic climate is not right for economic aid to a former
enemy.23 2 With growing economic concerns at home, aid
to the former Soviet Union is not as politically viable as it
once might have been.233
Public opinion is turning towards a course of action
where the Soviets are allowed into the United States to
trade goods and services rather than the United States
doling out economic aid. For example, one commentator
has stated when referring to the possibility of the United
States purchasing the MIR space station: "Why throw
charity at uncertain Soviet bureaucracies when we can do
something that's good for us, good for the Russians and
good for opening reliable long term trade?" 23 4This is also
a rational for allowing Russia full entry into the United
States commercial space launch marketplace.
Furthermore, by assisting in the transformation of the
Russian economy through the opening up of trade restric-
tions in the commercial space launch industry, the United
States would assist in giving the people of Russia a sense
of worth in their own accomplishments. Russia then
could take pride in their own civilian industry which, in
the long run, should give a boost to their economy and
decrease their reliance on the military-industrial complex.
At the same time, a reduction in future and current aid to
Russia would allow the United States to use the money
saved to help pay for domestic programs during the re-
cession in the United States.23 5
The United States could also save money by cutting the
232 See Helen Dewar, Congress Seems Ready to Help Soviets, but How is the Question,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1991, at A24.
233 See id.
234 Alcestis R. Orberg, Wanna Buy a Space Station - Cheap?, USA TODAY, Sept. 4,
1991, at 11.
235 Eric Schmitt, Moscow Aid Plan Dying In Congress, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at
Al.
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costs associated with enforcing export controls on satel-
lites to the former Soviet Union. Export controls cause
the U.S. government and industry to absorb both eco-
nomic and non-economic costs. 23 6 Economic costs in-
clude lost business transactions, damaged international
business relations and loss of world market share, while
non-economic costs include re-occurring international
political frictions and domestic political tensions.23 7
Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to per-
mit Russia full entry into the U.S. commercial payload
market under the aforementioned criteria since it would
help not only the former Soviet Union's economy, but the
United States' as well.
VIII. BENEFITS OF RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INDUSTRY
A. BENEFITS FOR THE UNITED STATES SPACE PROGRAM
"Right now Soviet Space Industries have the know-how
to build the best launch vehicles in the world, and the
cheapest. Even with a quick renaissance of launch tech-
nology in the West, its rockets for many years will be
much more expensive than Russia's. 23 8
As demonstrated by this statement by Roald Sagdeev,
former head of the Soviet Space Program, one advantage
that would accrue to the U.S. Space Program in lifting the
ban on the use of former Soviet expendable launch vehi-
cles to boost United States manufactured payloads, would
be access to the "best launch vehicles in the world. 2 39
But clearly the biggest benefit for the United States in
permitting the full entry of the former Soviet Union into
the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace is the other
space-based trade it could spur.
216 See Homer E. Moyer & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 150 (1988).
237 Id.
238 Stewart, supra note 73, at 56, 63, 122 (quoting Roald Sagdeev).
231 Id. at 63.
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For example, Art Dula,24 ° president of Space Com-
merce Inc., is pushing the idea to the United States to use
Soviet booster rockets to launch the space station Free-
dom into orbit.2 4 1 Dula claims the United States will save
approximately four billion dollars by allowing the former
Soviets to launch the space station and that this would be
a logical course for the United States to take.242 Dula ex-
plained that the United States has stated its intention to
launch the space station Freedom into orbit in seventeen
pieces on the space shuttle, but that Soviet boosters,
which are larger and more powerful, could launch it in
just two pieces. 43 Furthermore, Dula alleges that by us-
ing Russian booster rockets the United States could save
the expensive and short-lived space shuttle for more im-
portant missions. 244 To quote Dula: "We're going to have
to give these guys foreign aid. I think it's better that we
buy from them, let them be proud of what they sell, then
just give them money. It just seems to make sense
"245
In line with this, the Clinton administration has recently
ordered NASA to work with Russia in redesigning the
space station. 246 NASA may include in its plans the use of
the Energyia booster rocket to launch the space
Station.247
Another residual benefit of allowing Russian entry into
the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace is demon-
strated by the results of a joint study by Stanford Univer-
sity, the Soviet Union, and NASA. This study found that a
240 Art Dula was the authorized representative of the former Soviet Union in
selling Soviet space goods and services to the United States. He is continuing in
the same position for Russia.
24 1 Doug Miller, Far Out! Russians Ready To Put Freedom in Orbit, HOUSTON Bus.
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joint United States/Soviet/European/Japanese mission
could put astronauts on Mars within twenty-one years at
one-third the cost of options the United States is pres-
ently pursuing if the project uses Soviet manufactured
heavy-lift booster rockets. 248 Future projects such as this,
which could now reach fruition for less money and in
quicker time periods, instead face the threat of never oc-
curring since the collapse of the Communist regime has
caused a severe loss of funds to Russia's space pro-
gram.249 By allowing Russia to sell its space launch serv-
ices to U.S. payload manufacturers, an influx of hard
currency could flow to the former Soviet Union's space
program, keeping it financially viable. 5 °
Of equal importance, a long term benefit of easing re-
strictions aimed at the former Soviet Union in the U.S.
commercial space launch market is that perhaps one day
Russia's entire space industry would be opened to the free
world. 25 1 This would allow the United States and our al-
lies to take advantage of other portions of Russia's space
industry which are preeminent.252
B. BENEFITS FOR RuSSIA
The immediate effects of President Clinton lifting his
248 Soviet Energyia Booster Recommended for International Manned Mars Expedition,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 1, 1991, at 20.
249 Russian-French Launching, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at C8.
250 See Covault, supra note 75, at 18. (recognizing that "[S]oviet space launch
operations have dropped to their lowest levels in 25 years, and the evaporation of
a stable central government has already begun to affect planning for future U.S.
space cooperation."); Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Approved, supra note 87,
at 2 (stating that on June 18, 1992, NASA signed a commercial agreement with
the Russians to conduct technical tests on some of their space equipment).
251 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 73, at 62 (discussing Sagdeev's inventions while
affiliated with the Soviet space program); Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Ap-
proved, supra note 87, at 2 (discussing NASA-Russian commercial space
agreement).
2.2 For example, in June of 1991, the Soviets announced plans to launch the
world's largest and most powerful communications satellite system in 1993, using
technology from its military satellites. The satellite will have European configura-
tion spot beams and will cover parts of Africa and Asia. It will have the capacity to
carry five television stations, high definition television, radio and telephone calls.
The Soviet Union Satellite Launch, SATELLITE NEWS, June 17, 1991, at 8.
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predecessor's continuing ban on the full entry of Russia
into the United States commercial space launch market-
place would rightly fall on the latter. Such a new commer-
cial space launch policy could provide the impetus for the
former Soviet space program to start aggressively market-
ing its launch services around the world on a competitive
basis. This in turn would bring in much needed hard cur-
rency to a newly independent Russia without it having to
beg for aid from the industrialized free world. 53 Analysts
agree that the best way to help the faltering former Soviet
Union's economy is for the United States to buy its ad-
vanced space goods and accept its numerous offers for
space services.25 4
Furthermore, since arms sales were always heavily re-
lied upon for generating hard currency for the former So-
viet Union,255 it is important for world security to allow
commercial industries to develop and replace military in-
dustries.2 56 Therefore, if Russia agrees to cease prolifer-
ating ballistic missiles and agrees to restrictions on access
to technology and free market pricing, it should be al-
lowed to regain the loss of the monetary benefit from
arms sales, in part, by the sale of launch services to the
U.S. commercial communications satellite market. This
would give Russia's economy the impetus to change from
one based on the military-industrial complex into one
based on civilian industry.
Furthermore, as discussed, an influx of currency is nec-
essary to save Russia's space program. The space sector
253 "The Soviets are so desperate they'd sell you Yuri Gagarin if it would get
them money," said space policy expert Joan Johnson-Freese, referring to the first
man to orbit the earth. I. K. Brown, For Hire: Soviet Space Program, GANNETr NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
2-4 See, e.g., William J. Broad, Almost Broke, Soviet Union's Space Efforts Go On Sale,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at Cl; AnthonyJ. Blinken, Cold War Static on Fiber Optics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992, at 19.
255 See generally Senator John McCain, Controlling Arms Sales to the Third World,
WASH. Q., Spring 1991, at 79.
2- Russian President Boris Yeltsin has recognized the importance of space-re-
lated international trade for Russia's future success. SeeJames R. Asker, U.S., Rus-
sian Space Pact Pledges Unprecedented Trade, Joint Flights, AVIATION WE. & SPACE
TECH., June 22, 1992, at 24-25.
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in the former Soviet Union has been in a state of "massive
confusion. ' 257 This situation is particularly acute with the
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States.258  Therefore, to save the former Soviet Union's
space program, as both an asset to Russia and the world,
there needs to be a direct influx of hard currency. Presi-
dent Clinton could supply hard currency for this purpose
by dropping President Bush's ban on the launching of
U.S. commercial payloads on former Soviet rocket boost-
ers. Easing communications satellite trade restrictions
would also help compensate for the loss of jobs because
of the former Soviet Union's crackdown on the military
industry in the recent past.2 59 The military establishment
workers could then be reemployed in the civilian space
industry, which would further aid Russia's economic
recovery.
Another benefit of easing U.S. trade restrictions to al-
low Russian booster rockets to carry U.S. payloads is to
transform one-time Soviet military rockets into rocket
boosters2 60 used for peaceful space purposes. An exam-
ple of this type of conversion occurred when the former
Soviets began their remote sensing business, using a con-
verted military satellite to relay data to earth.2 6 ' Addition-
ally, Russia under the START Treaty262  can retain
strategic missiles in excess of the treaty's limits for the
purpose of delivering objects into outer space or the up-
217 McCain, supra note 253, at 79 (quoting Marcia S. Smith, Soviet space expert
for the Congressional Research Service).
258 See Covault, supra note 75, at 18; see also Russian Space Program Will Fall Short of
1980s Launch Pace, SATELLITE NEWS, Oct. 12, 1992, at 4.
259 See Velocci, supra note 188, at 68.
260 Booster rockets used for lifting satellites into orbit are generally modified
ballistic missiles or technically similar equipment. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz,
U.S. Entrepreneurs Seek Russian SLBMs, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 19,
1993, at 22.
261 See Soviets Launch Almaz 1 Remote Sensing Satellite, SATELLITE NEWS, Apr. 15,
1991, at 10; see also Robert W. Stewart, Soviets Look to U.S. For Buyers of Space Data,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at D2.
262 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START). Special START Treaty Supplement, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1991, at 1.
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per reaches of the atmosphere.26 3 The peaceful use of
such one time military equipment by the former Soviet
Union will assist in easing tensions over security between
the newly independent Russia and the western world.
Such conversion, however, was not allowed to occur
with ballistic missiles that were the subject of several
other modern strategic and tactical offensive arms control
treaties. For example, under the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF),2 4 the United States and the then So-
viet Union were under an obligation to eliminate their in-
termediate-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles, and
not to have such systems afterwards. 265 The INF Treaty
required that the missiles covered by the treaty be de-
stroyed by various methods, including demolition or
burning, depending upon the type of missile.266 This pro-
cess of elimination was to be completed within three years
after the treaty went into force.267 Therefore, as of 1990,
there were no longer any missiles covered by the treaty in
existence.
Therefore, Russia, under several strategic and tactical
offensive arms control treaties, could not convert covered
ballistic missiles into commercial space expendable
launch vehicles. This prohibition, if incorporated into fu-
ture United States-Russian arms control agreements, has
a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, Rus-
sia must spend additional monies to build expendable
launch vehicles, as opposed to following the more eco-
nomical route of converting treaty covered ballistic mis-
siles into commercial space launch vehicles. On the
positive side, U.S. proliferation concerns are lessened
when ballistic missiles under an arms control treaty are
destroyed under an accountable system and not converted
263 HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11, at 84.
264 S. TREATY Doc. No.1 1, 100th Cong., - Sess. (1987) reprinted in ARMS CON-
TROL TODAY, Jan/Feb. 1988, at INF Supp. 2.
265 Id.
266 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DIS-
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 422-30 (1990).
267 Id.
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to commercial use. This is because accountability for bal-
listic missiles is less certain under a conversion program
than a destruction program, since even transformed bal-
listic missiles retain their inherent dual-use capability. 268
Another benefit for the former Soviet Union if allowed
full participation in the U.S. marketplace for commercial
space launches, is that Russia could eventually privatize its
space industry and form corporations like General Dy-
namics and Rockwell. 269 This too will assist in Russia's
transformation towards a free market economy. Addi-
tionally, Russia, by living up to U.S. restrictions on its en-
try into the commercial space launch marketplace, could
prove itself as a trustworthy trading partner to the free
world. This in turn would assist it in attracting other in-
ternational trade.
C. BENEFITS TO THE CONSUMERS OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
A large benefit gained by allowing the former Soviet
Union to offer commercial launch services to United
States payload manufacturers is reasonably priced tele-
communications services. A residual benefit for the
United States will be the ability to carry out two treaty ob-
ligations and one statutory mandate, which also require
the provision of satellite telecommunications services at
reasonable rates. INTELSAT is the International Tele-
communications Satellite Organization which provides
various communications services to world-wide users.27 °
The United States is a party to the INTELSAT treaty.27 t
Under the INTELSAT treaty, the parties to the agree-
26 See supra part VI.C. (discussing ballistic missile proliferation concerns of the
United States).
260 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, Lockheed, Khrunichev to Market Proton Launcher,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 4, 1993, at 24 (stating that Lockheed of the
U.S. and Khrunichev of the former Soviet Union formed a joint venture to market
Russian space launch vehicles commercially).
270 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-




ment, in setting up a global commercial communications
satellite system, state in the preamble that the organiza-
tion is: "Determined ... to provide, for the benefit of all
mankind, through the most advanced technology avail-
able, the most efficient and economic facilities possible
consistent with the best and most equitable use of the ra-
dio frequency spectrum and of orbital space . "_.. ,272
INMARSAT is the International Maritime Satellite Or-
ganization. 73 The United States is also a party to the IN-
MARSAT convention.27 4 The INMARSAT treaty, in
establishing a maritime satellite system, states in its pre-
amble that one of the organization's main purposes is: "to
make provision for the benefit of ships of all nations
through the most advanced suitable space technology
available, for the most efficient and economic facilities
possible consistent with the most efficient and equitable
use of the radio frequency spectrum and of satellite
orbits."275
The United States Congress, in establishing the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962,276 stated in its dec-
laration of policy and purpose:
The new and expanded telecommunication services are to
be made available as promptly as possible .... In effectu-
ating this program, care and attention will be directed...
toward efficient and economical use of the electromagnetic
frequency spectrum, and toward the reflection of the ben-
efits of this new technology in both quality of services and
charges for such services.
Therefore, under both the INMARSAT and the INTEL-
SAT treaties, the organizations are charged with offering
satellite telecommunication services at economical prices
272 Id. at 3814 (emphasis added).
273 Convention for the International Maritime Satellite Organization, Feb. 15,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 1 [hereinafter INMARSAT Treaty].
274 Id.
27- Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
276 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
277 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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to their users. 2 78 Furthermore, under the Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, COMSAT must offer its serv-
ices in an economical manner.279 Clearly, the United
States is under two treaty obligations and one statutory
mandate to offer economical satellite telecommunication
services without compromising the quality of services.
For the United States to fulfill its international obliga-
tions and statutory mandates it must allow Russia to enter
the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace. Russian
launch services will presumably be more economical to
use than U.S. commercial space launch services, even
under the constraint of fair pricing agreements, and the
quality of telecommunication services would not be
compromised. 8 °
Another consideration in allowing Russia entry into the
U.S. commercial space launch marketplace is that if IN-
TELSAT or INMARSAT did choose Soviet booster rock-
ets to launch its telecommunication satellites into orbit,
U.S. manufactured payloads would be prohibited from
being launched upon them.28 ' Under the 1990 Commer-
cial Space Launch Policy, U.S. manufactured payloads are
not permitted to be launched by Russian expendable
launch vehicles except under limited circumstances. 2
President Clinton must act to change the 1990 Commer-
cial Space Launch Policy in order to ensure that U.S.
payload manufacturers have the opportunity to compete
for INMARSAT and INTELSAT launches performed by
former Soviet expendable launch vehicles.28 This will
278 See INTELSAT Treaty, supra note 268, 23 U.S.T. at 3814; INMARSAT
Treaty, supra note 271, 31 U.S.T. at 3.
279 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1988).
280 See Quayle Advises White House, supra note 3, at 3. McDonnell Douglas claimed
that Russian launch prices were cheaper than those of United States companies.
Id.
281 In June of 1992, President Bush approved the first launch of a U.S. commer-
cial communications satellite on a Russian booster rocket for an INMARSAT mis-
sion. Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Approved, supra note 87, at 1; see also supra
part IV.C.
282 Launch Policy, supra note 2, at M-4.
283 Despite President Bush's recent authorization for Russia to launch a U.S.
communications satellite for INMARSAT, neither Russia nor the U.S. commercial
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ensure that U.S. payload manufacturers can compete in
big ticket commercial space telecommunications projects
by international consortiums that have chosen Russia as
the launch service provider. In the long run, the benefits
of more economical launches would accrue to the ultimate
beneficiaries of U.S. telecommunications services, Ameri-
can consumers.
IX. CONCLUSION
The opening up of the commercial space launch mar-
ketplace to the former Soviet Union could lead to other
ventures which bring in capital to Russia, thereby assist-
ing in its transformation to a free market economy, and
ultimately, to a democratic ally of the United States.
While allowing Russia full access to the U.S. commercial
space launch marketplace might be greeted by staunch
protests from home and abroad, President Clinton should
be a world leader in heading off the return of Commu-
nism. President Clinton should take the initiative to ne-
gotiate executive agreements with the former Soviet
Union, as his predecessor did with Chinas 4 concerning
technology transfer objectives and free market pricing.
He should institute interim measures until a ballistic mis-
sile non-proliferation treaty regime can be formally con-
cluded. In return for non-proliferation agreements,
President Clinton should allow Russia full entry into the
United States commercial launch marketplace and push
for such reforms internationally.
The rationale behind opening up the commercial space
launch industry to the former Soviet Union is best
summed up by a Moscow commentator: "Understandably
... the (Western) ban on cooperation with the Soviets was
ideologically motivated, but it seems as though this obsta-
cle crumbled ... [a]nd if the Western countries enter into
communications satellite industry is guaranteed that this policy will continue
under the Clinton administration. See Proton Launch of INMARSAT Satellite Ap-
proved, supra note 87, at 1.
28 See supra part V.D.
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normal cooperation with us, space could be one of the few
areas where the U.S.S.R. has something to offer. '2 85
In sum, the ideals and self-interest of the United States
must continue to direct considerable energy and creativity
at the former Soviet Union. This time, however, it must
not be directed at destroying an enemy, but at fostering a
democratic, free market, economic ally. President Clinton
can further this goal by allowing newly-independent Rus-
sia to enter the U.S. commercial space launch marketplace
as a full participant. Agreements covering free trade, bal-
listic missile non-proliferation, and technology transfer
restrictions are the means to this end.
285 Soviet Space Launches Slowed by Tight Budgets, Declining Threat, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Sept. 5, 1991, at 364.
